**The creation of a Regional Investment Reform Agenda in the Western Balkans and its implications for Chinese investments: case study on the Republic of Macedonia**

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**ABSTRACT**

At the EU-Western Balkans (WB) Summit held in Trieste in 2017, a decision was made to launch the creation of a WB Regional Economic Area. The objective is to increase growth and create jobs by promoting strengthened economic integration of the WB region. The steps leading to this goal include, inter alia, harmonization of national investment policies in the 6 WB economies with EU standards and best practices, by focusing on: enhancing entry and establishment procedures for investors, improving business establishment policies and procedures, aligning the legal framework for investment, strengthening investment retention mechanisms, developing a regional investment promotion initiative, streamlining incentives and improving their transparency and governance.

This paper aims to examine **the impact that the initiative may have on Chinese investments in the WB region**, focusing particularly on the Republic of Macedonia as a case study. Given the **very limited inflows of Chinese FDI in Macedonia** thus far, the basic assumption to verify or falsify is that **reforms in the area of investment policy in the WB region will lead to attracting more FDI in the region and in particularly in Macedonia, especially by Chinese companies**. The interplay of the **16+1 cooperation and the EU-China relations** will be considered in order to assess the synergetic/competitive influence of the broader geopolitical context.

The data collection methods will include a review of primary and secondary sources and survey/interviews of Chinese companies/business people present in Macedonia on their perceptions and expectations regarding the national investment policy towards Chinese investors. The research will consist of three parts: (1) review of the existing contractual framework between China and Macedonia in the area of investments and comparison with standard EU provisions that will be the future benchmarks; (2) analysis of the current situation regarding Chinese investments in Macedonia; (3) conclusions with predictions on how the situation may unfold with recommendations.

## Introduction

Following the efforts to enhance Western Balkans (WB) regional cooperation within the framework of the Berlin process and especially at the last EU-Western Balkans summit which took place in Trieste, Italy in 2017, the countries from the WB region decided to engage in the creation of a Regional Economic Area. One aspect of the Regional Economic Area is the Regional Investment Reform Agenda (RIRA) which aims to harmonize investment policies among the 6 economies and with the EU best standards and practices. The main driver behind RIRA is the desire to attract more foreign investors in order to foster growth and create jobs, while upholding fair competition and sustainability. The latter is particularly important given the fact that the region has started to build an image as an investment destination with cheap and high-skilled labor, offering “dumping-like” government incentives and producing low-value goods, which essentially leads to a “race to the bottom” in terms of social, fiscal and environmental standards.

RIRA was adopted on 11 May 2018 and consists of 3 broad areas of action[[1]](#footnote-1):

* Investment entry and establishment – focusing on existing barriers to investment, business establishment policies and procedures;
* Investment protection and retention – focusing on reexamining international investment agreements (i.e. Bilateral Investment Treaties) and investor grievance mechanisms;
* Investment attraction and promotion – focusing on the joint promotion of the region as an attractive investment destination, streamlining governments’ incentives and promoting their transparency and governance.

Given the different current situation in each of the 6 economies and their different starting points, the next step to be implemented is for the WB economies to develop National Action Plans which will define specific activities to achieve RIRA’s goals. The Government of the Republic of Macedonia in September 2018 created an inter-ministerial taskforce that will be responsible for the oversight of RIRA and the creation and implementation of a National Action Plan. While RIRA is still in an embryonic phase, the article at hand aims to examine whether **reforms in the area of investment policy in the WB region will lead to attracting more FDI in the region and in particularly in Macedonia, especially by Chinese companies.**

This is in particular relevant in the context of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) which is the Eurasian grand strategy of the People’s Republic of China that seeks to expand and secure maritime routes and road infrastructure networks for China from Asia, across Africa, to the Middle East and Europe including South-East Europe. Providing loans at low interest rates, acquisition of ports, opening of bank branches in the region or official lending for bridge building, highway construction and power plant renovation, creation of infrastructure of transport and logistics networks are among the new developments for the countries in the WB region. Particularly for Macedonia, which is not a prime destination for FDI and faces limitations in terms of private sector lending, such developments have the potential to be very attractive and to create profound implications in terms of overall socio-economic development and Chinese economic presence.

The findings are based on input obtained through semi-structured interviews conducted with policy makers, as well as micro-survey with Chinese entrepreneurs who have invested in Macedonia or have tried to and gave up, representatives from big Chinese corporations with branch offices in Macedonia and Chinese financial institutions. A questionnaire was used to survey their degree of familiarity with the conditions to invest in Macedonia, as well as their perceptions regarding the visibility and publicity of investment opportunities, the ease of investing and doing business in the country, the main obstacles that they may face and the priorities when selecting an investment destination in general. Notwithstanding the limitations of the data collection method due mainly to the limited sample of respondents, language barriers and different surveying environment (in person vs. online), the obtained responses represent very similar and coherent perception. This implies that the insights are valid and solid basis for an initial analysis.

The article presents the following structure: the first part briefly examines the current situation regarding Chinese investments in the Western Balkans and focuses more specifically on Macedonia. The second part analyses the potential reasons behind the low level of Chinese investments as seen from the Chinese perspective. The third part analyses how the identified obstacles can be addressed through RIRA. The last part provides conclusions and specific policy recommendations.

## The (non)existent Chinese investments in Macedonia

The recently signed agreement between the Serbian Government and Shandong Linglong to build a tire production plant near Zrenjanin worth almost 1 billion USD and hiring 1.200 workers[[2]](#footnote-2) probably made envious every government in the region. Until this investment, Chinese investments in the 5 WB countries[[3]](#footnote-3) (both infrastructural and FDI), amounted to less than 3% of the overall Chinese FDI in Central and Eastern Europe[[4]](#footnote-4) and represented an insignificant percentage compared to the overall Chinese investments in Europe. This is due in part to a mismatch between the WB investment opportunities and the priorities of Chinese companies when considering where to invest. While China favors mergers and acquisitions, technology transfers, acquisition of brands and advanced management skills, most WB countries look for green-field or brown-field investments that would create jobs and boost the local economies. Since the European economic and sovereign debt crisis and especially after the slowdown of Europe’s economic growth in 2011[[5]](#footnote-5), China, through its companies and their investments, sought to sustain growth and restructure the composition of the economy. Therefore, Chinese investors oftentimes focus not on immediate profit, but on long-term success, prefer to engage in mergers and acquisitions and to buy “discounted” Western European companies which can provide them with assets which take time to build and provide significant competitive leverage.

***Table 1: Major Chinese Investments and Lending in Greece, Serbia, Macedonia, Bosnia and Herzegovina***

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Year** | **Country** | **Sector** | **Value in Billion/Millions €** | **State of Investments** | **Nature of Investments** |
| ***‘14*** | **Greece** | Transport/Container shipping | 1.1 Billion | Completed | Official lending |
|  |  | Transport/Container shipping | 0.340 Billion | Completed | Shipping Infrastructure |
|  |  | Transport/Container shipping | 0.490 Billion | Completed | Shipping Infrastructure |
|  |  | Transport/Container shipping | 0.158 Billion | Completed | Shipping logistics |
|  | **Serbia** | Energy | 293-608 Million | Ongoing | Thermal Power plant at Kostolac |
|  |  | Mihajlo Pupin Bridge over Danube | 260 Million | Completed | Bridge Building |
|  | **Macedonia** | Motorway Construction 110 km | 574 Million | Completed | Lending/ Construction Kicevo-Ohrid, Miladinovci-Stip |
|  |  | Railway | 50 Million EBRD Secured Loan | Completed | Electrical trains/Railway Modernisation |
|  | **Bosnia-Herzegovina** | Thermal Power Plant/Energy | 722 Million | Framework & Lending Agreement, Seeking loan guarantee | 15 % co-financing by EPBBiH, 85% loan from Exim Bank |
| ***‘15*** | **Greece** | Energy | 0.880 Billion | MoU | Energy generation |
|  | **Serbia** | Auto Industry | 60 Million | Completed | Obrenovac |
|  | **Macedonia** | N/A | N/A | N/A | N/A |
|  | **Bosnia-Herzegovina** | Transport | 600 Million | Planning stage | Motorway Construction+Lending |
|  |  | Energy | 350 Million | Completed | Official lending+ Construction of thermal power plant |
|  |  | Energy | 388 Million | Tender Process ongoing | Thermal Power plant, Coal mine operation |
| ***‘16*** | **Greece** | Transport Ports | 0.280.5 Billion | Completed | Majority shareholding |
|  | **Serbia** | Construction Corridor 11 | 350 Million | Ongoing | Cross Border Hughway Construction |
|  |  | Steel Smederovo | 46 Million | Ongoing | Modernisation Investments |
|  |  | Rail reconstruction | Over 1 Billion | Ongoing | Fast Rail link Belgrade-Budapest |
|  | **Macedonia** | N/A | N/A | N/A | N/A |
|  | **Bosnia-Herzegovina** |  |  |  |  |
| ***‘17*** | **Greece** | Energy/Electricity | 0.320 Billion | First stage completed-ongoing | 24% shareholding (right to acquire 66% majority) |
|  | **Serbia** | Sector banking | N/A | Completed | Greenfield investment, Branch network |
|  | **Macedonia** | Electric locomotives | N/A | Ongoing | Supplementary investment to 2014 |
|  | **Bosnia-Herzegovina** |  |  |  |  |

*Source: Authors presentation of data from EBRD, 2018*

The overview of Chinese lending and investments in the last 3 years shows that Greece and Serbia have attracted quite a lot of Chinese capital in shipping, construction of motorways and energy, compared to Macedonia which is lagging behind. In Macedonia there have been two major investments in infrastructure in 2014 and 2015 (constructing motorways and the modernization of the railway) and no major greenfield or brownfield investments so far. This is also in line with the decline of Macedonia’s proactive attitude within the 16+1 forum since the change of Government in 2017. According to a matrix to calculate the level of ambition in the China-CEE cooperation framework, Macedonia was ranked 8th, within the group of “ambitious” partners in the period 2013-2015, but fell to the 13th place in the period 2016-2018 and is now labeled as “follower”[[6]](#footnote-6).

Considering that Macedonia was among the first countries in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) to use the funds available in the 16+1 cooperation, there were expectations that the country would increase its visibility in China, especially among Chinese policy makers and big companies, in order to create new avenues for economic cooperation and speed up its economic development. Hence, the strategy oriented mainly towards foreign direct investors that would open new factories or restart the old ones also enhanced the hopes of a more productive economic cooperation with China. Reinforced by the many reforms to improve the business environment, including fiscal policy reforms (introduction of low and flat tax rates, no tax on re-invested profit), creation of special zones for foreign investors with more favorable rules and regulations in comparison with investments outside the zones, (partial) exemption from certain public duties and charges, subsidies for construction of production plants and other production-related expenses, like machinery, creation of state agency tasked with attracting FDI and providing after-care support and services, etc, these efforts led to Macedonia ranking 11th worldwide according to the World Bank’s Doing Business report in 2017[[7]](#footnote-7). The previous government even had a plan to create special “free zones” for Chinese companies only, with even more favorable conditions. This proposal was put forth at every 16+1 summit in the first several years of the cooperation. Yet, not a single big Chinese company came to invest and stay in Macedonia and the overall level of Chinese investments remains below 0.1% of the total inward FDI[[8]](#footnote-8).

Today the investment relations between both countries are governed by a bilateral investment treaty (BIT) signed in 1997. It’s a standard agreement which aims to promote and protect respective investments on both sides by providing fair treatment, non-discrimination, dispute settlement mechanisms etc[[9]](#footnote-9). In addition, following the launch of the BRI, the two countries in 2014 signed a Memorandum of Understanding where China commits itself to “*encourage its companies to invest and develop in Macedonia, with priorities on industrial and technological cooperation in fields such as industrial parks, infrastructure, processing and manufacturing, energy, fishery and tourism*”[[10]](#footnote-10). Macedonia on the other side commits itself to “*work actively to create a favourable investment environment for Chinese companies*”[[11]](#footnote-11). From this perspective and given the low level of Chinese FDI, the Memorandum seems to hold more symbolic meaning than practical value.

Unlike big European countries which provide significant market potential and investment opportunities, Macedonia has a market of only 2 million. It offers solid conditions for doing business, especially in the free zones, FTAs which offer tax-free exports to a market of 500 million consumers, but the size of its market, along with its organization, or lack thereof, acts as impediment to big investments. The limited production output is not sufficient to satisfy the needs of bigger markets, such as China and ensure permanent supply. Most of the potential investment opportunities do not offer any technological or innovation advantages, nor brands that would be interesting for Chinese companies. With minor exceptions, this is also the case with the other WB economies.

Finally, it is still uncertain what the multiplier effect of the infrastructure investments would have over time. Namely, the Macedonian companies in the construction sector benefit from the motorway projects for the duration of such projects, but they do not offer sustainability and spill-over effects. It is expected however both the investments in motorways and modernization of the railway to build closer trade ties with both China, but also European countries and especially exchange between the neighboring countries. However, to what extent these investments will impact SME development, additional job creation or a reversal of existing trade imbalances is still undetermined.

## “Invest in Macedonia” – through the eyes of the Chinese businessman

When identifying the priorities for Chinese investors, the most salient and common choice they all make among 10 given options is *Government support and incentives (100%)*. Likewise, when asked what the main obstacle is for Chinese investors to invest in Macedonia, their choice of preference is *Lack of government support and incentives (88%)*. Given that an important component of the strategy to attract foreign investors until recently was the support that the government provided to foreign investors, especially in the free zones, it is worth examining why there is such a widespread perception among Chinese investors that there is not (enough) government support and incentives. A part of the explanation can be sought in the level of information that Chinese investors obtain regarding the investment opportunities and incentives.

While the majority of them claim to be at least partially familiar with the conditions to invest, 38% of them have not seen *any publicity among Chinese investors* about the investment opportunities in the country. Many of them believe that Macedonia, as a country in general, is rather unknown to the average Chinese. It seems that the ample promotional campaigns and activities of various sorts (TV and newspaper/magazine commercials, business forums etc.) organized and delivered by the previous government did not produce the desired results when it comes to attracting Chinese business investors. The promotional channels and media outlets that were used (Financial Times, Forbes, CNN etc.) are not the most suitable in order to reach Chinese investors. Many traditional Western media, social media, websites and applications are either not popular, influential or even accessible in China.

Another potential reason for the perceived lack of information and government support and incentives is the capacity, professionalism and integrity of the administration that is at the forefront in dealing with foreign investors. As one interviewee points out: “*Good policies can be easily blocked in practice by a lazy bureaucrat or a corrupt one*”[[12]](#footnote-12). In this context, the link between the highest political level and the civil servants working in the area of investments should be strengthened, in order to improve the oversight, management and quality of policy implementation. This would be beneficial to identify whether the problem lies within the quality of the investment policies, as considered by half of the respondents, or within their practical implementation as it is often underlined by the EU in its reports. In addition, 40% of the surveyed business people believe that additional efforts should be made to ensure that possible miscommunication and misunderstanding do not occur because of intercultural and linguistic barriers.

While half of the respondents think that market size is important when choosing investment destinations in order to enable economies of scale, only a quarter see the size of the Macedonian market as an obstacle to investment. This can be related to the level of integration of the Macedonian economy in Europe and the Free Trade Agreements (FTA) that enable exports with no additional charges for products of Macedonian origin to a market of 500 million consumers. In this context, the survey reveals that whether Macedonia is not an EU or NATO member does not seem to be of any relevance for Chinese investors.

The issue of obtaining visas is considered an obstacle by 75% of the respondents. Since the initiative to bilaterally eliminate visas was officially announced around one year ago, the expectations on the Chinese side rose high leading at present to a certain dose of disappointment and negative impact on the prospects for attracting Chinese investors.

## RIRA: obstacles and opportunities for foreign investors

As one Macedonian high-ranking civil servant points out, “*one of the biggest risks for the implementation of RIRA and at the same time the biggest reason behind (some) governments’ reluctance to engage more proactively is the fear to be deprived of their biggest “asset” – the control over the policies and incentives*”[[13]](#footnote-13). For a very long time the countries in the region have considered themselves competitors in attracting FDI, that today they hardly know how to cooperate in that area. This is also supported by the fact that the composition of their economies is very much alike, not complementary but competitive and they see incentives as the only aspect which can bring them a competitive edge[[14]](#footnote-14). Given the importance bestowed on government support and incentives by Chinese business people, the effort to streamline and improve the governance of the incentives through RIRA would appear to be counterproductive to attract Chinese FDI.

Competitive attitude based on the differences between the countries can be beneficial for foreign investors - specifically China - for its own gains and profits and lead to a race to the bottom in terms of incentives, concessions and deviations from the rules and best practices. Nevertheless, it is also an obstacle for China to adopt a more targeted and integrated regional approach that would enable large-scale projects and investments. On one side, an increased convergence of the rules among the WB economies would facilitate the “learning process” and allow for China and its companies to transfer and use the regulatory know-how and experience gained in one country throughout the entire region and more broadly in Europe. On the other hand, it would help to avoid scenarios like the one following the acquisition of Piraeus Port in Athens by Chinese COSCO, when social protection standards were seriously undermined and Chinese investors faced a wave of criticism and bad image across Europe[[15]](#footnote-15). Chinese companies are aware of this criticism and they have since begun to pro-actively engage with civil society representatives, non-governmental organizations, chambers of commerce and universities on issues ranging from the transfer of professional skills, environmental impact assessment or strategic SME development.

The fact that Chinese companies have become very skilled at investing in EU Member States and Chinese investments in the EU per capita largely exceed those in the Western Balkans implies that EU’s rules and policies *per se* are not deterring Chinese investors, on the contrary. Moreover, enhanced respect for rules and standards would be beneficial in cases of political and economic instability, investments with low returns or without guarantees, and possible illegal or unethical behavior by individual companies. This is all the more visible with the current investigations into the former Macedonian government’s business deals with Chinese companies Yutong and Sinohydro. More transparent and better governed incentives may lead to restore mutual trust and to improve the overall image of Chinese companies in Macedonia.

With the EU accession process, Macedonia will transfer the exclusive competence in terms of investments to the EU institutions. In the meantime, the EU is negotiating a BIT with China on behalf of its Member States which will become binding for Macedonia and the other WB countries after they join the EU. In addition, it is about to adopt legislation which will introduce a compulsory FDI screening procedure by the European Commission targeting investments from third countries, namely China[[16]](#footnote-16). The purpose will be to identify and prevent investments which “*may affect projects or programs of Union interest on the grounds of security or public order*” and to verify whether “*a foreign investor is controlled by the government of a third country, including through substantial funding”.*[[17]](#footnote-17)Both initiatives have created a certain amount of fear among smaller EU Member States that the new instruments in the hand of the European Commission could be used to divert investments from and into certain countries[[18]](#footnote-18). In that context, RIRA will be beneficial as a learning process for the Macedonian institutions to better understand the EU rules of the game, to adapt to the clauses of the new investment agreement that they will have to adhere to and to learn how to attract investors while navigating the new system.

While many aspects related to the economy are given (size, resources etc.), there is also a multitude of parameters that can be improved and RIRA is a good starting point. Chinese business people, like any other, need and expect political, economic, legal and institutional stability, as well as support from the government institutions to invest and conduct their operations. RIRA can provide a much needed screening of all the procedures and policies which need improvement in order to enable easier market access and business operations for foreign investors, but it will also create a level-playing field and help to avoid a “race to the bottom”. In addition, promoting the WB region as a joint investment destination can be synergetic to the promotion of Macedonia itself. Speaking particularly about Chinese investors, RIRA could raise awareness about investment opportunities in the WB and in Macedonia and offer unified investment conditions and policies that will enable large-scale projects.

## Conclusions and recommendations

Macedonia as well as the other WB economies need to “reinvent” themselves and their investment opportunities in order to be more attractive for foreign investors. A thorough analysis should be conducted in order to identify some kind of competitive edge for each of them and areas where their mutual cooperation is possible, desirable and feasible. While the investment opportunities and policies may not be the reason for the low level of investments, the entire process of promotion, attraction and business operation needs to be reviewed and improved. Particular attention needs to be addressed to the issues of administrative capacity in order to strengthen the transparency, implementation and oversight of investment policies.

With the ongoing/forthcoming EU accession process for all the WB economies, as well as the prospects of membership and acceptance of EU’s acquis in the area of investments, there is no need to re-examine or attempt to modify the bilateral legal framework for investments. The time and energy allocated to this task within RIRA could be instead used to develop more transparent and better governed investment incentives that will be intended for attracting foreign investors in general and Chinese companies more specifically. Thus, a new communication and visibility strategy needs to be put in place which will take into account the specificities of Chinese investors and habits in terms of media, social media and advertising. This applies to the promotion of individual countries, as well as the joint promotion of the WB region as an investment destination.

Better mutual understanding, more intensive communication and exchange, as well as respect for the rules and best practices on both sides will foster long-term business relations based on trust and improved image on both sides. All this requires improving the WB governments’ understanding and knowledge of the Chinese business culture, adopting a proactive attitude and developing a mid to long term China policy.

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