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DECENTRALISATION AND THE DELIVERY OF PRIMARY AND SECONDARY EDUCATION



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Decentralisation and the Delivery of Primary and Secondary Education

Skopje, 2011

CONTENTS

1. Introduction

This paper will examine whether devolving responsibility for the management of public services can satisfy the demands of non-majority groups for greater autonomy over their own affairs. Whilst responsibility for a range of public services[1] was decentralised to municipalities in Macedonia, I have chosen to concentrate this assessment on primary and secondary education for a variety of reasons. First, primary and secondary education was one of the first competencies to be devolved to municipalities in July 2005. Expenditure on education constitutes almost half of all government transfers to municipalities and "...the success of the entire decentralisation process is now in large measure dependent of what happens in primary and secondary education..." (Levitas 2009, 5). Second, how education systems are designed and delivered is of particular importance to minority ethnic communities since education is crucial for reproducing (and re-creating) the identity of a group (Bieber 2007, 17). Without the transmission of the aspects of their identity through education, notes Florian Bieber, non-majority cultures may disappear. Third, as one of the basic factors of human development, education is an important means of improving life chances, reducing poverty, and promoting social inclusion. It therefore represents a significant mechanism for addressing the underlying causes of conflict between different ethnic groups (UNDP 2010; 2004). Finally, given the various education-related disputes that have undermined community relations during the 1990s, education was and remains a highly contested political issue in Macedonia (Poulton 2000; Vetterlein 2006; Myhrvold 2005; Petroska-Beska & Najčevska 2004). Its delivery, notes the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), can either promote or block reconciliation, depending on the education policies adopted and the way they are implemented (UNDP 2009, 43).

This review begins with the principle arguments in favour and against devolving responsibility for the delivery of education to local communities. An assessment of the Macedonian education system prior to decentralisation will

1 Primary healthcare, social welfare and child protection, utilities, etc. (Official Gazette 2002, Art. 22).

follow, accompanied by a discussion of the reforms introduced in 2005. Three key theoretical arguments will then be considered within the Macedonian context: (1) whether decentralisation facilitates heterogeneous policy-making, (2) decentralisation's ability to enhance participation and transparency in decision-making, and (3) whether decentralisation ensures a more equitable and transparent distribution of public resources. This paper does not intend to assess whether decentralisation has improved educational outcomes in Macedonia, since measuring the quality of education is problematic due to a lack of reliable data. Educational standards are also affected by additional factors unrelated to decentralisation, such as teacher training, which cannot be easily isolated. Instead, the paper argues that the decentralisation of primary and secondary education to municipalities has enabled local communities to more effectively meet the diverse needs of citizens. Persistent challenges, such as the politicised nature of the education system, increasing ethnic segregation in schools, and the limited capacity of local stakeholders, unless adequately addressed, may however undermine the benefits of reform in the longer term.

2. Decentralised Public Services and Conflict Mitigation

One of the most frequently cited theoretical arguments which promotes decentralisation as tool for managing ethnopolitical conflict is its ability to offer spatially concentrated minority ethnic groups greater control over their own affairs, thereby providing greater scope for the protection of their cultural identity (Horowitz 2000, 217-20; Kälin 1999, 307; Safran & Maiz 2000, 259). By granting non-majority groups greater control over their own destinies, decentralisation is believed to instil a greater sense of security within these groups that they will not be subject to discriminatory practices and unwanted intrusions in the future (Manor 1999, 97; Jeram 2008, 9). Having greater decision-making power over local affairs may also allow different ethnic groups to better meet the diverse needs of their communities. The ability to differentiate policy to heterogeneous tastes can allow locally elected representatives to proactively address would-be tensions before conflict situations arise (Siegle & O'Mahoney 2007, 1; Illner 1998; Lake & Rothchild 2005, 121; Norris 2008, 159). The remoteness of central governments to citizens, note Walter Kälin and Wolf Linder, often leads to insufficient information regarding local needs and problems (Kälin 1999, 47; Linder 2010, 9). Bringing government 'closer to the citizen' can therefore allow local communities the opportunity to more effectively express their preferences for public services and to participate in their design (CoE 1985, Preamble). Local administrations, concludes Kälin, can be more physically accessible to the average person and thus more 'human' than a very distinct and mighty central administration (Kälin 2004, 304).

The proliferation of self-governance units, coupled with a greater degree of fiscal decentralisation, may also have a moderating effect on another principal cause of conflict: the allocation and distribution of public resources.

Feelings of grievance regarding obvious relative deprivation, note Grasa and Camps, often become the source of potential conflict (Grasa & Camps 2009, 32). Decentralisation may, according to Manor, alleviate inter-regional disparities by promoting a more equitable distribution of state resources by giving remote, poor and previously underrepresented areas greater access to resources and influence (Manor 1999, 104). Decentralisation can also promote "political realism", since a local government's daily interactions - and frustrations - with central institutions will make them more aware of budgetary constraints and generate a more realistic understanding of what is and is not possible from the public purse (Manor 1999, 48). This realisation, concludes Manor, should promote political stability, since it will protect the political system from the backlashes which can occur when expectations are inflated and feelings of deprivation exist (Manor 1999, 48, 49).

Arguments which favour devolving responsibility for education to municipalities as a means of easing ethnic tensions are particularly relevant in multiethnic / multilingual societies such as Macedonia. The significance of being able to differentiate policy to heterogeneous tastes, for example, providing education in a community's mother tongue cannot be underestimated. Many of the school-based conflicts which arose in Macedonia during the 1990s, for example, developed out of a widespread dissatisfaction with the quality and availability of Albanian and Turkish-medium education (Vetterlein 2006, 8). Devolving management responsibilities to representative local bodies, such as municipal and school councils, enables greater participation from the local community in decision making processes and can allow citizens to more effectively express preferences. Enhanced participation may also improve community empowerment, accountability, transparency, and institutional responsiveness to local needs, since local communities will possess better knowledge of local conditions than a distant central government (the asymmetric information argument) (Barrera-Osorio et al. 2009, 34; Di Gropello 2004, 1; Cohen 2004, 5). Involving local, diverse communities in the management of schools will therefore increase the legitimacy of the decisions that are made and possibly the education system more generally (Poiana 2011, 436; McGinn 1999, 31). The problem of "legitimacy crisis", notes Péter Radó (2010, 77), together with an inability of central governments to implement decisions locally, is often cited as the reason why governments devolve education responsibilities to local communities. Devolving education responsibility to local communities can therefore contribute to correcting the deficiencies associated with overly centralised systems.

3. Striking a Balance between Centralised and Decentralised Education Systems

Despite the prevalence of decentralised education reforms worldwide, the academic community and more recently donor agencies have become increasingly doubtful of their ability to improve the delivery of education locally. Such scepticism stems from both a lack of empirical evidence to validate claims and the existence of negative consequences associated with decentralisation that could potentially dilute the benefits of reform. Researchers warn, for example, that reducing central government's ability to act against capture by local elites and the entrenchment of patronage politics under decentralisation. If the capture of political processes by interest groups is easier at the local level, decentralisation may favour those local groups disproportionately (Galiani et al. 2004, 4; Barter 2008; Blunt & Turner 2005, 79; Devas & Delay 2006, 692; Scott 2009, 7). Differences in fiscal and administrative capacities at the local level may also exacerbate disparities in spending and educational outcomes within municipalities (Winkler & Yeo 2007, 1; De Grauwe 2004, 3). In a paper entitled 'helping the good get better but leaving the rest behind', Galiani, Schargrodsky and Gertler (2004) researched the effect of secondary school decentralisation in Argentina on education quality. Their results found that the higher the provincial fiscal deficit, the smaller the positive impact of decentralisation, and the effect of school decentralisation on test outcomes was in fact negative in provinces running significant fiscal deficits (2004, 28).

Given the very real risks associated with devolving education responsibilities to municipalities, it is no wonder many countries maintain centralised systems. One argument in favour of centrally controlled education finances is based on egalitarian principles which regard central control as the key for re-

ducing or eliminating disparities perceived to be unfair (Radó 2010, 13). Advocates claim that people (and especially those poorly educated), if left to their own devices, will invest less in education than is good for them individually (Levitas 2002, 6). Central government is thus obliged to take action to ensure investments in education reaches socially desirable levels. This can be done by redistributing wealth through equalising grants or the direct provision of education services, although, notes Tony Levitas, this rarely results in the degree of equality sought. Another argument in favour of maintaining central control over education policy emphasises how decentralisation may weaken the education ministry's ability to implement necessary structural and curriculum reforms (WB 2002, 16; Winkler & Yeo 2007, 1; Levitas 2002, 7). Given these conflicting - but entirely rational - arguments, it comes as no surprise, concludes Levitas, that most educational systems not only combine central and local responsibilities, they are continually being fine-tuned in the search for the most socially acceptable, economically efficient, and educationally productive balance (Levitas 2002, 7).

4. Education Delivery in the Republic of Macedonia Prior to Decentralisation

In response to economic and political instability in the wake of the break-up of Yugoslavia, newly independent Macedonia abandoned the Yugoslav tradition of extensive autonomy and financial independence for municipalities and initiated a policy of centralisation. This process, notes Jan Herczyński (2009) an expert working with the Ministry of Education and Science (MoES), was particularly severe in the education sector. The MoES explained the damage centralisation did to the education system in its ten year strategy, published on the eve of decentralisation:

> "This situation has generated many problems such as an inflexible structure of the system, marginalisation of the idiosyncrasies which stem from the specific features of the environment or place ... the existence of complex bureaucratic procedures in reaching decisions, the inability of the system to adapt to dynamic changes ... The procedures for choosing teaching and management staff have been focused towards one power point - the Ministry, which has resulted in the domination of party political and ethnic and personal interests when implementing the procedure of selecting staff, and marginalisation of professional quality as a key criterion ... Moreover, the responsibility of the schools, parents and local community for efficient functioning, and the opportunities for designing and implementing school development plans have been limited by complex bureaucratic procedures and restricted opportunities for finding alternative sources of finance" (MoES 2005, 22).

As a result of the centralisation, schools' autonomy was retracted and they became directly responsible to the MoES. The powers of School Boards were also revoked and transferred to the MoES. Although the Boards formerly retained a limited advisory role, their voice was routinely disregarded by central authorities. This structure led to the undemocratic governance of schools and key stakeholders, such as parents and teachers, were neither consulted nor informed of government decisions (Myhrvold 2005, 23; WB 2002, 3). Centralisation also led to politicisation of the process of nominating and dismissing School Directors, since the decision was now taken by the Minister himself (Herczyński 2009, 108). Some schools, notes Merle Vetterlein, also received preferential treatment due to better contacts with those responsible in the Ministry (Vetterlein 2006, 9). Centralised decision-making regarding staffing and the opening and closing of the schools, recalled employees from Kumanovo municipality, seldom corresponded with local needs, particularly in remote and sparsely inhabited areas of the country (Kumanovo 2010, 8). A further consequence of the centralising tendencies of the MoES was that its burgeoning administrative load distracted it from performing crucial strategic functions effectively, such as policy formulation, long-term planning, and standards setting (WB 2002, 13; Myhrvold 2005, 22).

The financial dimension of the centralisation was no less extreme than the political one and was motivated by a desire to control spending in a period of fiscal constraints (Herczyński 2009, 109). Between 1996 and 2004, the budgets of all schools were prepared by the MoES and all school expenditures (even minor ones, such as magazine subscriptions) were processed by the centralised treasury system operated by the Ministry of Finance. The system of allocation norms for salaries and material expenditures based on the number of eligible classes a school provides, notes Herczyński, was supposed to ensure a basic level of equity of school funding, and to a certain extent it succeeded. However, it also blocked any local initiatives in the system, failed to ensure efficiency, and was unable to keep pace with shifting demographic patterns (Herczyński 2009, 110). Population changes at the time were characterised by rapidly increasing growth rates in ethnic Albanian-dominated municipalities and declining student numbers in Macedonian-majority rural areas. The result was substantial disparities in education spending across municipalities, which to a large extent reflected lower spending per student in dominant ethnic Albanian schools (UNICEF 2009, 31; WB 2008, 23).

Table 1: Class Sizes and Expenditures in Primary Education per Student by Type of Municipality, 2003

Type of Municipality	Data	Macedonian		Mixed	Albanian		Macedonia
		> 95 Percent	70-95 Percent		70-95 Percent	> 95 Percent	
Skopje	Municipalities	2	3	3	1	1	10
	Class size	27.3	26.0	26.9	23.3	23.2	26.2
	Cost/ student (MKD)	18,806	19,005	17,372	22,098	20,415	18,527
Large Cities	Municipalities	2	2	1	1		6
	Class size	23.2	23.7	24.9	27.0		24.52
	Cost/ student (MKD)	20,752	21,514	18,364	16,117		19,286
Small Cities	Municipalities	18	6	3			27
	Class size	21.9	22.4	23.6			27
	Cost/ student (MKD)	23,067	21,545	18,501			21,271
Rural	Municipalities	16	9	7	3	6	41
	Class size	18.3	18.8	19.0	23.4	23.6	20.89
	Cost/ student (MKD)	27,573	27,516	26,564	17,977	18,317	22,647
Macedonia	Municipalities	38	20	14	5	7	84
	Class size	22.39	23.17	23.92	17,977	18,317	22,647
	Cost/ student (MKD)	22,366	21,496	19,255	17,005	18,784	20,459

Source: (Herczyński 2009, 127)

Table 1 illustrates significant disparities in primary education spending across municipalities based on urban/rural and ethnic characteristics in 2003. A comparable analysis based on fiscal data for 2005 was prepared by the World Bank and its findings corroborate these conclusions (WB 2008, 24). The data in Table 1 shows that the average per-student expenditure for primary schools

in 2003 was 20,459 Macedonian Denar (MKD) (highlighted in table). However, expenditure varied considerably across municipalities from MKD 16,117 in large cities, such as the predominantly ethnic-Albanian municipality of Tetovo, to MKD 27,573 in rural, predominantly-Macedonian municipalities. Such disparities are matched by variations in class size: 27 students per class in Tetovo and 18.3 students in the rural Macedonian municipalities (Herczyński 2009, 127). Since rural Albanian communities have school networks with urban characteristics (large class sizes), per-student spending in rural Albanian dominated municipalities, notes Herczyński, was smaller than in rural Macedonian ones. The World Bank's analysis concludes that whilst spending disparities can be partially explained by different student-teacher ratios across municipalities, funding inequalities appear to reflect the practice of allocating resources to schools on the basis of number of classes rather than the number of students (WB 2008, 23). The World Bank's analysis also notes that spending outcomes prior to decentralisation were similar at the secondary level.

Table 2: Utilities and Maintenance Costs in Primary Education per Student, 2003

Type of Municipality	Data	Macedonian		Mixed	Albanian		Macedonia
		>95 Percent	70-95 Percent		70-95 Percent	>95 Percent	
Macedonia	Municipalities	38	20	14	5	7	84
	Heated space for students (m2)	4.97	4.42	3.63	2.19	2.20	3.95
	Heating cost per student (MKD)	1,240	1,503	1,081	712	611	1,149
	Maintenance per student (MKD)	2,786	2,818	1,787	854	708	2,139

Source: (Herczyński 2009, 129)

A further consequence of economic stagnation and uneven demographic shifts was that, since the government could no longer afford to invest sufficiently in education, the school infrastructure was unable to keep pace with the rapidly changing student population. The data in Table 2 illustrates that the space per student in Macedonian-majority municipalities was significantly high-

er (more than double, highlighted in table) than in predominantly ethnic-Albanian municipalities. This suggests many more Albanian students were obliged to attend school in multiple shifts during this period (Herczyński 2009, 106). Since funds for heating were calculated according to the size of heated space, in addition to the number of class shifts, heating costs per student also varied significantly across municipality and ethnic group. Finally, the data in Table 2 shows how maintenance costs per student during 2003 also varied significantly across municipality; much greater than the disparities in total per-student spending (Table 1) (Herczyński 2009, 129). Whilst both Jan Herczyński and the World Bank's analysis concentrate on funding disparities between ethnic-Albanian and Macedonian-dominated municipalities, it is logical to assume the funding system would have created similar inequalities for other ethnic groups experiencing rapid birth rates and living in densely populated areas, for example the Roma.

The legacy of more than a decade of over-bureaucratic, centralised management and insufficient funding of school infrastructure was an education system no longer able to meet the diverse needs of its citizens. This was particularly true for ethnic and linguistic communities, whose educational preferences differed from the majority, and those living in rapidly expanding urban areas. Undemocratic school governance structures and an increasingly politicised educational environment often lead to tensions locally and resulted in the de-legitimisation of educational reforms and possibly also the government in the eyes of marginalised local communities. Dissatisfaction over unequal educational standards - whether perceived or real - also increased tensions between different ethnic groups (Poulton 2000; Myhrvold 2005; Petroska-Beska & Najčevska 2004). The next section will examine the changes introduced as a result of the decentralisation process in 2005. It will be followed by a discussion of whether this process has been successful in addressing some of the negative legacies of the previous decade.

5. Changes to the Education System as a Result of Decentralisation

The decentralisation process, which seeks to enable greater community involvement in educational matters either directly or indirectly through their municipal representatives, began on the 1st July 2005. Table 3 summarises the division of key responsibilities between stakeholders at the central, municipal and school levels. Responsibility for primary and secondary education was transferred to the municipalities and they became 'founders' of schools; assuming ownership over school buildings, responsibility for their maintenance, and the payment of staff salaries. Municipalities acquired the task of organising transport for students living more than two kilometres from school, student dormitories, and for taking decisions on the opening and closing of schools, based on predefined criteria and the approval of the MoES. Local influence over the appointment of School Directors was also enhanced by granting Mayors responsibility over their appointment and dismissal, based on proposals from School Boards (Official Gazette 2002, Art. 22.1; 2009; 2008a). It is important to stress that responsibilities crucial to the design of the education system, such as the development of curricula, approval of textbooks, teacher training, and ultimate approval of many local decisions remain with central government.

Table 3: Responsibilities of Stakeholders within the Decentralised Education System

Central Government	Municipalities	Schools
Prepares legislation, curricula, standards and strategic policy	Is 'founder' of school and is responsible for maintenance of school buildings and staff salaries	Adopts schools' statute
Adopts plans and programmes for schools	Establishes and/or closes down school and decides on their location	Proposes annual work programme; reports on schools' performance to Municipal Council
Defines the conditions to be met for founding a school	Adopts school decision to open or close classes, including those in different languages of instruction	Proposes annual financial plan to municipality
Manages and partially finances the education system through transfers to municipalities	Appoints and/or dismisses School Director, upon the proposal of School Board	Proposes annual balance of accounts to municipality
Approves draft textbooks	Organises and pays for transport and/or accommodation for students living far from schools	Advertises for election of School Director, conduct interviews and propose two candidates to Mayor
Adopts policies, procedures and conditions for professional and pedagogical training	Manages spending of central government transfers and provides own-source finances	Provides opinion on appointment of teachers and professional associates to School Director
Carries out external assessments of students' achievement (exams)	Appoints municipal representatives to School Boards	Makes decisions regarding complaints and appeals by school employees, students and parents
Supervises legal compliance of school programmes and monitors quality and efficiency of system	Supervises working conditions in schools, enrolment, transport, food, accommodation of students, etc. (municipal inspector)	
Operates the information system of education (data collection)		

Given the increase in responsibilities at the local level, municipalities are obliged to establish education units within their administrations, as well as appoint Municipal Education Inspectors to supervise the delivery of education locally. Whilst the role of Municipal Education Officers remains to be standardised, a project managed by the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) in coordination with MoES, the municipal association (ZELS) and Municipal Education Officers during 2009 sought to define their function precisely. It suggested their key roles are to: supervise the start and end of the school year; compile school data on behalf of the MoES; monitor procedures for supplying heating materials to schools, transportation, and food for students; liaise with schools and the MoES; and to mediate education-related disputes (OSCE 2009b, 3; 2008a, 9). The role of Municipal Education Inspectors, when appointed by Mayors, also remains unclear[2]. However, it is assumed their task is to supervise the working conditions in schools, the enrolment of students, and ensure satisfactory arrangements for transport, food and student accommodation (OSCE 2006, 14).

Increasing the powers of School Boards, the management body of schools, is another important element of decentralisation which aims to promote greater democratic governance within schools. The Boards have now been assigned significant powers, including the authority to propose the school's annual work plan and budget to Municipal Councils, adopt the school statute, and propose the selection and dismissal of School Directors to the Mayor. Membership of the School Boards has also been altered, with parents now assuming a third of seats and municipalities about the same. Other School Board members include teachers and professional associates, the MoES and, in the case of secondary schools, a representative of the local business community (Official Gazette 2009, Art. 88). The role of School Directors has also been strengthened. Key aspects of their role is to undertake measures for the implementation of the school's work plan, perform the selection of staff and make decisions on their deployment and termination, and report on the implementation of the work plan to the MoES and municipality (OSCE 2006, 18). In an attempt to further de-politicise their appointment, a state exam for School Directors has now been introduced (Official Gazette 2009, Art. 128, 129). Whilst not strictly a feature of the decentralisation process per se, steps to professionalise the School Director's role should been regarded as a direct consequence of their enhanced responsibilities and will hopefully lead to the more effective management of education locally [3].

This process of political and administrative decentralisation of the education sector was accompanied by a fiscal decentralisation, carried out gradu-

2 Executive Director of ZELS – interview, 08/04/2011, Skopje.

3 Senior representative of the State Examination Centre – interview, 07/04/2011, Skopje.

ally in two phases. The division into two stages, whereby progression into the second phase was only permitted when municipalities fulfilled certain legal criteria[4], was proposed by the International Monetary Fund and was motivated by the fear that poor fiscal management on behalf of the municipalities may contribute to an excessive budget deficit (Herczyński 2009, 131). During the first phase, which commenced in July 2005 and continued for two years, municipalities received earmarked grants from central government to cover maintenance costs (heating, electricity, etc.), repairs, and student transportation. Staff salaries, however, continued to be paid directly by central government (Herczyński 2011, 8). In the second phase, which began in September 2007 for those municipalities that satisfied the criteria, municipalities were entrusted with the payment of staff salaries. The earmarked grants received from the Ministry of Finance during the first phase were transformed into categorical block grants, and both these and the block grants received for salaries could not be smaller than the equivalent funds previously allocated to the municipalities (Official Gazette 2002, Art. 12). Whilst receipt of block, as opposed to earmarked grants allows municipalities greater discretion over how they could assign funding locally, neither the categorical grants for school maintenance or the grants for salaries can be used for purposes other than education (Herczyński 2011, 8).

Another crucial fiscal reform introduced as a result of the decentralisation process was the move to a weighted education funding allocation formula based on the numbers of students in schools located in the municipalities, rather than on historical costs. The importance of this formula for the funding of primary and secondary education cannot be underestimated, notes Tony Levitas, since a weighted per student system of financing over the longer term is the only way of ensuring funds flow to where they are needed, i.e. where students attend school (Levitas 2009, 24). Not only does the use of such an allocation formula seek to ensure greater equity of funding across different municipalities; it also aims to improve transparency within the allocation of resources and reduce the possibility of discretionary payments.

The formula introduced for allocating primary education categorical grants to municipalities consists of the following three elements: a lump sum, allocated to each municipality irrespective of the number of students located in its territory; payment based on the number of students attending schools located in municipalities, which is weighted for schools located in municipalities with low population density; and lower and upper buffers used to protect municipalities from excessive changes to the previous year's allocation (Herczyński 2009, 140). The role of the lump sum is to protect smaller municipalities with fewer students that still need to maintain schools for them. The role of the weights for

4 Municipalities possess an adequate staff capacity for financial management, shows good financial results for at least 24 months, has no arrears to suppliers or any other creditors exceeding those ordinary terms of payment (Official Gazette 2004, Art. 46).

students in municipalities with low population densities is to provide additional funds to the small schools with small classes, where maintenance costs per student is higher (2009, 141). The formula for allocating secondary education categorical grants to municipalities is very similar to that of primary education, however it initially did not include a lump sum and used only one density threshold. This changed in 2008 when the density threshold was abandoned and a lump sum added (Herczyński 2011, 17). As with the categorical grants, the allocation formula for block grants for primary education, introduced in 2008 for those municipalities in the second phase, also includes a lump sum, weighted per student payments based on population density, and the use of lower and upper buffers. However, it also includes two additional coefficients, for students with special needs and for subject teaching to reflect the higher costs of teaching in higher classes (2011, 19-20). In contrast, the allocation formula for block grants for secondary education is much simpler and includes only a lump sum and one coefficient for students of vocational education (2011, 21).

6. Decentralised Education and the Promotion of Heterogeneous Policy-Making

i. Mother Tongue Education Provision

One of the most broadly acknowledged rights in international minority protection standards is the right for non-majority communities to receive education in their mother tongue. Whilst various international treaties advocate such an approach[5], the key document for states aspiring towards membership of the European Union is the Council of Europe's Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities (FCNM) and specifically Articles 12 and 14 (CoE 1995). It is worth emphasising that Macedonia has maintained an impressive record of ratifying international minority rights treaties and incorporating them into national legislation[6], although it has not yet signed the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages (ECRI 2010, 7). Despite this, various incidents prior to 2005 suggest the provision of education in non-majority languages, such as Albanian and Turkish, has been contentious in some localities. In Bitola during May 2000 for example, several thousand teachers, students and parents took to the streets to express discontent with government plans to open Albanian-medium classes for students at the 'Josip Broz Tito' gymnasium (Myhrvold 2005, 36). Protests of a similar magnitude erupted at the school once again in September 2003 when for a second time the government tried to open

5 Article 5 of the UNESCO Convention Against Discrimination in Education and Article 4 of the UN Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities.

6 This is reflected in the Constitution (Official Gazette 2001, Art. 48), both laws on Primary and Secondary Education (2008a, Art. 9; 2009, Art. 4), and legislation promoting and protecting the rights of members of communities which are less than 20 percent of the population (2008b, Art. 5).

Albanian-medium classes (Myhrvold 2005, 38; ICG 2003, 22). In the Skopje municipality of Čair, tensions also arose during September 2003 when the government transferred seven Albanian-medium classes to the secondary economics school 'Arseni Jovkov' (Myhrvold 2005, 31; ICG 2003, 22).

Despite such high profile cases, data published by the State Statistical Office confirms the vast majority of Albanian students have access to primary education in their mother tongue (Table 4). Whilst the actual number of students learning in Albanian has been gradually decreasing for a variety of reasons, the overall proportion of students attending Albanian-medium classes has increased and in 2010 stood close to 100 percent. The proportion of Turkish students learning in their mother tongue is much lower (approximately 60 percent, see Appendix A), however this too has risen in recent years. The official data verifies that the number of primary schools offering instruction in Albanian has also increased from 280 to 289 between the academic years 2003/04 and 2009/10 (Appendix C). Primary schools offering Turkish-medium classes also increased from 57 to 62 during this time. In contrast, the number of primary schools offering instruction in Macedonian and Serbian languages decreased from 764 to 729 and from 11 to 7 respectively. The number of primary school class sections available in the community languages reflects a similar trend, with classes in Albanian and Turkish increasing during this period from 3,087 to 3,426 and from 272 to 348 respectively, whilst classes in both Macedonian and Serbian languages decreased.

Table 4: Proportion of Ethnic Albanian Students Learning in their Mother Tongue (Regular Primary and Lower Secondary Schools)

Year	No. of Students	No. of Students Learning in Mother Tongue	Students Learning in Mother Tongue (%)
2004/05	75,491	73,932	97.93
2005/06	-	-	-
2006/07	78,467	76,718	97.77
2007/08	75,141	73,571	97.91
2008/09	72,570	71,091	97.97
2009/10	69,922	68,668	98.21

Source: State Statistical Office (2006; 2008; 2009; 2010a; 2011).

The data for secondary education, however, shows a slightly different picture. Here, the proportion of Albanian students attending classes in their mother tongue is lower but remains over 90 percent of all Albanian students (Table 5). Interestingly, whilst the number of Albanian students has been on the increase in recent years, particularly since secondary school attendance

became compulsory in 2008, so too has the total number of Albanians attending secondary school generally. The result is that the proportion of Albanian students attending Albanian-medium classes has in fact fallen slightly since 2005. Surprisingly, this has not been the experience of Turkish students who, in the past six years, have enjoyed secondary education in their mother tongue in increasing - if only moderately so - numbers (Appendix B). The data does however show that the number of secondary schools offering instruction in Albanian has increased impressively between the academic years 2003/04 and 2009/10 from 23 to 35, and the number of class sections from 521 to 853, even though the proportion of Albanians learning in their mother tongue has fallen (Appendix D). Schools and class sections offering instruction in Turkish has also increased significantly (more than doubled), as the student numbers would suggest.

Table 5: Proportion of Ethnic Albanian Students Learning in their Mother Tongue (Higher Secondary Schools)

Year	No. of Students	No. of Students Learning in Mother Tongue	Students Learning in Mother Tongue (%)
2004/05	20,409	19,352	94.82
2005/06	-	-	-
2006/07	23,282	21,835	93.78
2007/08	24,225	22,357	92.29
2008/09	25,857	23,914	92.49
2009/10	27,663	26,028	94.09

Source: State Statistical Office (2006; 2008; 2009; 2010a; 2011).

The official data, corroborated in interviews with Municipal Education Officers, suggest that since the decentralisation process began, it has become relatively easy for municipalities to open new classes where the language of instruction is not Macedonian. Indeed, whilst reviewing Macedonia's second State Report regarding implementation of the FCNM, the Council of Europe's Advisory Committee noted how:

> *"... efforts have been made to improve the situation of schools providing instruction in Albanian and experiencing problems because of increased demand ... The Advisory Committee notes that, although tensions arose several years ago between students and families from the Macedonian and Albanian communities concerning the introduction of Albanian-language classes and schools, these tensions have gradually eased..." (CoE 2008, 28)*

Despite clear progress, a few examples do still exist which suggest mother tongue education provision remains contentious in some municipalities. These challenges relate to the minimum threshold of students required to establish new classes[7] (24), resistance to employing additional Albanian or Turkish-speaking teachers (at the expense of Macedonian-speaking teachers), and the fact that any initiative must receive final approval from the MoES, in addition to the Ministry of Finance if there are financial implications. Persistent difficulties in opening of Albanian-medium classes in Bitola have still not been resolved, and other cases in Ohrid, Prilep, Veles, and the secondary school 'Cvetan Dimov' in Skopje have been given frequent, high profile coverage in Albanian-language newspapers such as Koha (Hasani 2010, 2; Papraniku 2011, 5). This undoubtedly provides readers with the perception that the challenges facing mother tongue education provision are much greater than they actually are.

A particularly high profile unresolved case concerns the primary school 'Goce Delčev', located in the village of Podgorci, Struga municipality. Prior to the start of the academic year 2008/09 the school's Council requested permission by the municipality to open Albanian-medium classes. Since the number of students (11) involved was below the legal threshold, the municipality agreed to pay the salaries of the three teachers required and submitted the request MoES. In the absence of any response from the MoES, the classes were formed in November 2008 after a two-month delay. The request eventually received approval from the (ethnic-Albanian) Deputy Minister of Education on the 9th March 2010, only to be reversed three weeks later by the Minister himself (of Macedonian ethnicity). The Minister declared the classes illegal, since they lacked ministerial approval, and since then the parents of the students affected have been fined and been issued with a court summons. Questioning the level of Albanian language proficiency of the eleven students, the MoES has proposed to establish a commission in order to assess their right to 'mother tongue' education in Albanian. The case is controversial because it involves Macedonian Muslims (Torbeshi), vulnerable to the assimilationist tendencies of the local Albanian population. It also occurs in Struga, a municipality significantly affected by the territorial reorganisation of 2004, and where relations between the (now majority) ethnic-Albanian and (previous majority) Macedonian communities are often fragile. Parallels can and have already been drawn with the closing of two private primary schools offering Turkish medium classes in Centar Župa municipality the police in 1995. A subsequent Constitutional Court ruling, contrary to the principle of self-identification for national minorities, supported the gov-

7 Classes with fewer students can be established if the municipality concerned agrees to pay related staffing costs. Such initiatives still require approval from the MoES, however.

ernment's decision to close the schools. It emphasised how the Turkish minority in the area did not speak sufficient Turkish to claim the right to mother tongue education for their children (Wilson 2002, 57).

Currently primary and secondary education in a student's mother tongue is only available to Albanian and Turkish students, while a small proportion of Serbs (less than ten percent) can also attend classes in their mother tongue (Appendix E). As a consequence, other communities living in Macedonia, such as the Roma, Vlach, Bosniaks, in addition to most Serbs and many Turks, attend Macedonian-medium classes (Appendix F). In response to recommendations from the Council of Europe's Advisory Committee on the FCNM that "requisite attention is paid also to the needs of the smaller minorities", the MoES introduced a selection of elective classes ('the Language and Culture of Roma/Vlachs/Bosniaks') in 2008 (CoE 2008, 29). These classes are offered once a week for third grade students and in two classes per week from students attending fourth to ninth grades (MoES 2010a, 24). As a method of promoting language proficiency for the smaller communities in their mother tongue, the elective classes are not currently offered to students of other ethnicities, nor are they available to Turkish and Serbian students unable to attend Turkish or Serbian-medium classes locally (2010a, 86). Elective classes in Albanian language are however available to all students from sixth grade. Whilst the classes represent a central government initiative, it is the responsibility of schools and municipalities to offer these classes and promote their availability to students and their parents. A survey carried out by the MoES in 2009 found that, disappointingly, relatively small proportions of Roma and Bosniak students had signed up for the elective classes, although the numbers of Vlach students doing so is more impressive. Low participation rates, concluded the MoES, "raises doubts about the procedures and manner in which the schools offer [the] subject to the students" (2010a, 25). The fact that at least fifteen students are required to form an elective class represents an additional challenge to opening further classes in the future.

ii. Rationalisation of the School Network

A second example of how decentralisation may enhance communities' ability to more effectively meet local needs is the devolution of responsibility for opening and closing schools to municipalities[8]. As previously discussed, the existing school network reflects the demographic situation of the 1960s and 1970s when most primary and secondary schools were built. This has re-

8 However, final approval is required by the MoES.

sulted in considerable discrepancies in the location of educational facilities. As elsewhere in the post-communist world, observes Tony Levitas, Macedonia inherited a large number of rural primary schools; schools that were largely responsible for making literacy nearly universal during the socialist period and to which people understandably are deeply attached (Levitas 2002, 13). However, continual demographic decline in rural areas which disproportionately affects ethnic-Macedonian communities, combined with increasing migration from rural to urban areas, has left many of these rural schools with very few students. Approximately 30 percent of all primary schools, for example, have less than twenty students and are increasingly costly to maintain (Appendix G). In contrast, population growth in urban areas, particularly those populated by Albanian and Roma communities in the north and west of the country, have resulted in significant overcrowding in schools (OSI 2007, 25). Considerable urban / rural disparities also exist in the secondary school network, which has been historically concentrated in the urban centres. Not only has uneven demographic growth resulted in significant overcrowding in many urban secondary schools, the lack of facilities in rural areas means students are required to travel long distances in order to attend class. Any decision concerning the redistribution of resources from under-populated (predominantly Macedonia) areas in the east of the country to over-populated (predominantly ethnic Albanian) areas in the north and west is understandably sensitive.

One example of how the inadequate school network manifests itself today is the significant proportion of schools required to operate multiple shifts in order to accommodate students. As the data in Table 6 shows, over one third of primary schools are obliged to operate two shifts, which usually run from 07.30 to 12.00 and from 12.30 to 18.00 each day (OSCE 2008a, 23). Whilst multiple school shifts is not a new phenomenon, it represented a persistence challenge to the delivery of equitable educational standards and only limited progress has been made since 2005 to resolve it. The data in Table 6 also confirms approximately ten percent of primary schools operate three shifts each day. During the academic year 2009/10 these schools were located in the municipalities of Šuto Orizari, Gjorce Petrov, Gostivar, Kičevo, Kumanovo and Strumica[9]. Operating multiple shifts not only requires lesson times to be shortened so that classes can be appropriately scheduled; it also limits the time and space available for extra-curricular activities or classes for students with additional support needs, such as language 'catch-up' classes. Interviews with Municipal Education Officers and a Secondary School Director in Šuto Orizari, Kumanovo and Gostivar municipalities verified that in such circumstances schools are compelled to

9 OSCE official – interview, 12/04/2011, Skopje.

shorten lessons to 30 minutes[10] (Kumanovo 2010, 109). Legally, the duration of lessons in primary schools must be 40 minutes and in secondary schools 45 minutes (Official Gazette 2009, Art. 39; 2008a, Art. 27).

Table 6: Regular Primary and Lower Secondary Schools and Students, According to the Number and Types of Shifts

No. of Schools							
	2003/04	2004/05	2005/06	2006/07	2007/08	2008/09	2009/10
One shift	601	598	-	591	583	586	597
Two shifts	399	402	-	390	401	394	383
Three shifts	12	10	-	19	3	11	10
Total	1,012	1,010	-	1,000	997	991	990

Source: State Statistical Office (2006; 2008; 2009; 2010a; 2011).

For secondary schools, the situation is more complicated since the schools function in multiple buildings and the shifts occur there[11]. Instead, the main source of complaints is overcrowding and reduced lesson time. Official data on either secondary school class sizes or the proportion of schools operating double or triple shifts is not publically available. However a 2008 report prepared by the World Bank estimates as many as 87 percent of secondary schools operate double shifts (World, 2008)30. Secondary schools in the urban municipalities of Kumanovo, Gostivar and Tetovo - all with significant Albanian and Roma student profiles - are known to experience particularly acute spatial problems[12] (Kumanovo 2011). In a survey commissioned by the UNDP in 2010, a quarter of interviewees complained about large classes; the proportion of which was higher among Albanian respondents since class sizes for this group, noted the report, are typically between 35 and 40 students (UNDP 2010, 98; Kumanovo 2011, 3; Sonce 2010, 15). Not only is such practice illegal, since the maximum class size permitted in both primary and secondary schools is 34; it is also contrary to good pedagogical practice and has an impact on the quality of learning (Official Gazette 2009, Art. 41; 2008a, Art. 28; WB 2008, 26).

10 Education expert, Šuto Orizari municipality – interview, 06/04/2011, Šuto Orizari; Municipal Education Officer, Gostivar Municipality – interview, 22/06/2011, Gostivar; Secondary School Director, Kumanovo municipality – interview, 05/04/2011, Kumanovo.

11 OSCE official - interview, 12/04/2011, Skopje.

12 OSCE official - interview, 12/04/2011, Skopje.

There is evidence to suggest the overcrowding experienced in secondary schools may have been exacerbated further by two reforms introduced by the MoES to improve student participation rates (OSI 2007, 170). The first was the introduction of the 'class zero' in the academic year 2007/8, increasing the number of primary school years from eight to nine. The second reform was the decision to make secondary education compulsory from the academic year 2008/09. Clearly, the rise in student numbers at both primary and secondary schools will exacerbate existing spatial problems. It has been estimated that the changes to secondary education alone will result in a rise in students numbers of between four and ten percent until 2012 (OSCE 2008c, 4; UNDP 2008, 41). Such increases will understandably be greater in areas where historically secondary school enrolment rates have been low (Roma, Albanian and Turkish communities) (UNDP 2004, 67). The result will be a disproportionate burden on those schools already significantly overcrowded (see Figure 1), unless substantial investments can be made to improve current facilities.

Figure 1: Map to Show Increases by Region in the Number of Enrolled Secondary School Students between 2003/04 and 2008/09



Source: State Statistical Office (2010b, 25)

Tables 7 and 8 demonstrate attempts to rationalise the primary and secondary school networks over the past eight years. A monitoring report on the decentralisation process prepared by the Center for Local Democracy Development found that initiatives to establish new or close down existing primary

schools are frequently raised by municipalities; however their implementation is slow (CLDD 2011, 9). In 2008 for example, five of the twelve municipalities monitored by the Center raised initiatives aimed at rationalising the school network; only three of which were successful. The record in 2009 was just as poor (from nine municipalities, only three initiatives were successful (2011, 10). An important obstacle to rationalising the school network, notes the report, is the "unduly response" of the MoES to applications, which can be take anything from one to three years (2011, 63). Another barrier to initiatives, apart from the obvious challenge of accessing resources, are unresolved property and tenure issues regarding school buildings, as well as vague Cadastre records (ZELS 2010; Herczyński 2011, 8; CLDD 2011, 10; Bakiu 2010, 28).

Table 7: Number of Regular Primary and Lower Secondary Schools Buildings

Year	No. of Schools
2002/03	1,020
2003/04	1,012
2004/05	1,010
2005/06	1,005
2006/07	1,000
2007/08	997
2008/09	991
2009/10	990

Source: State Statistical Office (2006; 2008; 2009; 2010a; 2011)

Table 8: Number of Regular Upper Secondary Schools

Year	No. of Schools
2002/03	96
2003/04	96
2004/05	100
2005/06	101
2006/07	104
2007/08	107
2008/09	110
2009/10	110

A very real dilemma exists regarding the building of additional secondary schools in areas not integrated into the existing network. A UNDP survey in 2008, for example, found that a significant proportion of secondary school students (21.3 percent) travel more than ten kilometres to attend classes (UNDP 2008, 79). This is particularly evident in rural areas, where 47 percent of population travel over ten kilometres to the nearest secondary school. Whilst shortening the distance students must travel to school will improve access to education, there is a risk building additional schools will 'ghettoise' rural communities by cutting them off from urban centres and with it, the prospect of integration into the wider (multicultural) society. Such dilemmas have influenced debates on whether to build new secondary schools in the predominantly Roma municipality of Šuto Orizari in Skopje, in Lipkovo and in Struga (both predominantly ethnic Albanian)[13]. Until discrepancies in the secondary school network are resolved, it is vital municipalities provide free transport for students travelling long distances so that the potential for educational exclusion is minimised.

iii. Renaming of Schools

The ability to change the name of a school so that it more closely reflects local preferences is a further example of heterogeneous policy making at the local level. It is also another issue which caused controversy prior to 2005 and led the OSCE's High Commissioner on National Minorities to observe how "decisions on renaming schools are currently taken by a simple majority and can have a polarising effect in multi-ethnic areas" (HCNM 2008, 4). An incident in 2003, for example, where Albanians in the village of Semsevo, north-east Tetovo ignored procedures and renamed the primary school 'Dame Gruev' after the first Albanian teacher from the region ('Jumni Junuzi') led Macedonian parents to withdraw their children from classes (ICG 2003, 22; NDC 2005, 3). In response, the High Commissioner's recommended:

> *"Changing the procedure for decisions on school name changes to a more consensus-based procedure that includes all relevant stakeholders to ensure that the new name is perceived as legitimate and does not offend people with different cultural backgrounds. This could be achieved through involvement of consultative bodies such as school boards ..." (HCNM 2008, 5).*

13 OSCE official - interview, 04/04/2011, Skopje.

Observers have noted a trend in the years since decentralisation to renaming schools previously called after Macedonian heroes and dates of historical significance with the names of Albanian or Turkish heroes and holidays (UNICEF 2009, 22). However, a review of school name changes initiated by the OSCE in 2011 found that, whilst some schools have changed their names, it is inaccurate to conclude a significant proportion has done so, or that school names have been replaced with controversial choices[14]. Indeed, a comparative review of school names in 2006 and 2010 suggests only around 14 schools have changed their names during this period, although there have been some additional cases since then and prior to 2006 (MCIC 2006; 2010). The OSCE's review did however find evidence of a handful of controversial cases, for example the renaming of schools after former National Liberation Army members in the municipalities of Lipkovo, Struga and Bogovinje, and of members of the Macedonian security forces killed in 2001 in Makedonska Kamenica and Zrnovci [15]. Another high profile case arose in Gostivar when the name of a primary school 'Bratstvo i Edinstvo' ('Brotherhood and Unity' in Macedonian) was replaced with the single word 'Bashkimi', meaning 'Unity' in Albanian. When Macedonian students refused to accept their graduation certificates, featuring the new school name, for over two years, a compromise was found and the school is now known as 'Bashkimi / Edinstvo / Birlik', the word 'unity' in Albanian, Macedonian, and Turkish languages[16].

Formal procedures for renaming schools do exist. Proposals for name changes must be initiated by the School Board, which requires the consent of the Municipal Council before being submitted to the MoES for final evaluation and approval. However, a senior representative of the MoES conceded that problems can and do still arise locally, although such incidents have been less frequent since 2010 since most schools that wanted to change their name have done so already[17]. Given the decisive role School Boards play in the process, it is essential they function democratically and are representative of local communities if further disputes are to be avoided.

14 OSCE official – interview, 12/04/2011, Skopje.

15 These schools are: Ismet Jashari, a secondary school in Lipkovo; Nuri Mazari, a primary school in Delogozda, Struga; Sabedin Bajrami, primary school in Kamenjane, Bogovinje; Mile Janevski Dzingar, asecondary school in Makedonska Kamenica; and Sinisa Stoilkov, a primary school in Zrnovci.

16 Municipal Education Officer, Gostivar Municipality – interview, 22/06/2011, Gostivar.

17 Senior representative of the MoES – interview, 07/04/2011, Skopje.

7. The Role of School Boards: Enhancing Participation and Transparency in Decision-making?

In a comprehensive review of school-based management processes on behalf of the World Bank, Barrera-Osorio et al. (2009) argue that greater community participation in school decision-making processes may improve accountability, transparency and responsiveness to local needs. However, they also observed how decentralisation does not necessarily give more power to the general public, since powers devolved are susceptible to elite capture. The risk is greater, they note, in countries where local democracy and political accountability may be weak, where "in some cases, the local community members organised to take over one or more school councils and then used the councils for their own political ends rather than for the better education of children" (2009, 35). Indeed, in recommendations to the Minister of Education and Science in 2004, the High Commissioner on National Minorities warned how, "in the extremely politicised environment, combined with a lack of an experience of democratic decision-making, it is unlikely that the situation [of governance in schools] would dramatically improve" (HCNM 2004, 4).

"It is often the case", observed the OSCE in 2008, "that School Boards are politicised thus upholding their political party's interests...Many Directors lobby among teachers and parents in order to get their preferred candidate elected" (OSCE 2008a, 16). Whilst one OSCE official remarked School Boards often operate as "mini municipal councils", with the appointment of representatives highly politicised and discussions dominated by only a handful of members, experiences, they note, are mixed and many Boards do function well[18]. In her of review of participatory administrative reform in South Eastern European

18 OSCE official – interview, 12/04/2011, Skopje.

schools, Sinziana-Elena Poiana stressed the importance of further efforts to improve the capacity of Board members and parents' awareness of their rights more generally in order that participatory school management becomes a reality (Poiana 2011, 450). A survey commissioned by the UNDP in 2010, for example, found that as many as 80 percent of parents indicated they would not like to complain about the education their child receives, even if they had cause to do so (UNDP 2010, 97). Relations between School Boards and Municipal Education Units and Councils need also to be enhanced, since many Boards consider their role has been marginalised by municipal management (OSCE 2008e, 13). Only a few municipalities, notes a review of decentralised public services, have established mechanisms for regularly reporting School Board decisions, with the majority of School Boards reporting to Municipal Councils only once a year (CLDD 2011, 62; OSCE 2008e, 15).

A School Board's ability to respond to heterogeneous needs, thus increasing the legitimacy of the decisions it makes, also depends on how well its membership reflects the diversity of the local community (Winkler & Yeo 2007, 2). Analysis of the membership of 60 primary School Boards that applied to the USAID's Schools Renovations Project during 2010 confirms that over half (34 of 60) did not represent the local student population they serve (Appendix H). Of these 34 boards, Roma students were under- or unrepresented on 18 of them, Albanian students in ten, Turkish students in five, and other ethnic groups six times. Macedonian students are not under-represented on any of the School Boards monitored. What the data does unfortunately not tell us is whether satellite schools, an important issue to be discussed in a subsequent section, are adequately represented on the School Boards. Under-representation of Roma, as well as other non-majority communities on School Boards has been confirmed in other, more comprehensive reviews (REF 2007, 52; OSI 2007, 238). Their representation is particular important given the fact that the Roma represent the fastest growing student profile in Macedonia (OSI 2007, 193). Roma students also experience particular challenges in relation to educational achievement, such as low enrolment and attendance rates, high drop-out rates, in-school segregation and discrimination, as well as over-representation in educational facilities for students with learning difficulties (REF 2007; Demarchi 2010; CoE 2008, 30; EC 2010, 62; ECRI 2010, 8). Whilst the enhanced powers devolved to School Boards may facilitate stronger participation of Roma representatives in decision-making processes, the Roma Education Fund has warned that massive local-level capacity building is required in municipal councils, municipal education commissions, school boards, and parents to ensure positive effects on the educational outcomes of Roma children (REF 2007, 24).

8. Towards a More Equitable and Transparent Distribution of Public Resources

i. Equitable Allocation of Funds for Education

Moving to a weighted funding allocation formula based on the numbers of students in schools has contributed significantly to the promotion of a more equitable distribution of state resources. Funds now flow directly to where they are needed and the use of lump sum payments, in addition to weights for schools located in sparsely populated areas, ensures the higher costs of delivering educational services in rural areas are met. However, an analysis of education funding completed by USAID in May 2011 suggests the simultaneous use of both the lump sum payment and population density weights in the calculation of primary education categorical and block grants is excessive and as a result, smaller municipalities are receiving relatively too much compared to urban municipalities (Herczyński 2011, 26). The situation was exacerbated in 2008 when changes were made to both the population density thresholds and weights, resulting in greater disparities between categorical and block grants to municipalities (2011, 14-15). Whilst it is reasonable that per student allocation formulas should take the higher cost of providing education in rural areas into account, the USAID analysis shows that, as a direct consequence of the changes in 2008, the differences between per student amounts for smaller and larger municipalities has grown considerably between 2006 and 2011 (2011, 25). Regardless of the need to fine-tune the current allocation formula for primary education, it is important to emphasise that per capita funding seeks to ensure greater equity over the longer term (Levitas 2009, 24-25). Significant capital investments will also be required in areas previously neglected so that persistent regional disparities can be addressed (EC 2010, 62).

One area where per capita funding is unable to address funding inequalities in education is the process by which resources are distributed at the school level, between the central school and its branches / satellites. Such units are subsidiary entities belonging to the central school and are managed by the Director of that school. Their unequal treatment, notes an expert who worked for more than five years with the MoES, "is like a family secret, which everyone knows but nobody wants to talks about" (Herczyński 2007, 2). In primary schools the satellites often provide teaching from first to fourth grades, with older students commuting to the central school (or sometimes to a larger satellite school) (2007, 1). Approximately two thirds of all primary school facilities in Macedonia are satellite schools, with a large proportion providing instruction in languages other than Macedonian. A comprehensive review of the treatment of satellite primary schools located in eight municipalities was prepared at the request of the ZELS' Education Committee in 2007 (Herczyński 2007). Whilst the review admits satellite schools are not an easy subject to discuss, since considerations of equity directly contradict considerations of efficiency[19], it concludes the unequal treatment of satellite schools is unacceptable on social and moral grounds (2007, 2).

Table 9: Conditions in Satellite Schools in Eight Municipalities

Condition	Satellite	Central
Facilities with unsafe roofs	16.7 %	3.5 %
Facilities with inadequate school furniture	51.3 %	12.0 %
Facilities with damaged floors	52.8 %	34.5 %
Facilities with old electrical networks	61.1 %	13.8 %
Facilities with inadequate toilets	63.0 %	21.0 %
Facilities heated with stoves for wood	91.7 %	44.8 %
Facilities without fire protection	98.3 %	83.3 %

Source: (Herczyński 2007, 4)

The data in Table 9 illustrates disparities in the condition of central and satellite school buildings located in the eight municipalities[20] reviewed during

19 "It is difficult, indeed probably impossible, to provide adequate school equipment for extremely small school facilities, when even large schools find it hard to secure adequate furniture and teaching aids" (Herczyński 2007, 2).

20 Berovo, Brvenica, Krusevo, Pehcevo, Resen, Strumica, Tearce and Vasilievo. The report

2007 (Herczyński 2007, 3). The review found that pedagogical support staff such as psychologists, speech therapists etc., tend to be concentrated in central schools and very rarely, if ever, work with satellite school students. The equitable distribution of teaching materials was also found to be problematic (2007, 5, 7). Given the significant differences in the conditions of buildings and their access to school equipment, regular co-operation between central and satellite schools is extremely important. However, the review found that in many instances such co-operation was lacking. In order to improve conditions in satellite schools, so that students experience the equal educational standards guaranteed by the Constitution, the review recommends schools collect and maintain data on the educational processes in each entity (Official Gazette 2001, Art. 44). School Boards, which operate at the level of the central schools, should be required to include representations from the satellite schools. Municipalities could introduce registries of resources to monitor access to equipment, teaching aids, and staff time, and request schools submit for review and approval separate financial plans for each school entity, rather than one for the whole school (Herczyński 2007, 10). Municipalities could also employ Municipal Education Inspectors to monitor the quality of education in the satellite facilities. It is unclear whether any of these actions regularly take place, if at all.

A further source of inequality left unaffected by changes to central government funding allocation is how much municipalities themselves contribute to local education budgets.

Within a decentralised context, central governments assume municipalities will contribute to the cost of delivering education services locally. However, two separate reports commissioned by USAID in 2011 suggest the overall level of contributions from municipal budgets is low (MLGA 2011; Herczyński 2011). In 2009, for example, 35 of the 66 municipalities in the second fiscal phase of decentralisation contributed 88,372,560 MKD to local primary education budgets during 2009, representing 1.3 percent of overall expenditure. In 2010, the number of contributing municipalities increased to 37 and the proportion of own source funding increased to 1.5 percent (MLGA 2011, 10, 17). For municipalities responsible for secondary education functions and in the second phase, 11 provided 20,081,953 MKD to complement central government transfers during 2009. This represents only 0.7 percent of the total amount transferred to second phase municipalities in 2009, although the amount did increase to 3.7 percent in 2010 (2011, 14, 21). Whilst the proportion of own-source funding

stresses the general structure of central and satellite schools in these municipalities is similar to the national structure.

is insignificant compared to central government transfers, both reports confirm that those contributing most to local education budgets are the wealthier municipalities, such as Karpoš, Centar (both in the City of Skopje) and Ohrid (Herczyński 2011, 42). As municipal contributions (hopefully) increase in the future, care should be taken to ensure educational standards in less affluent municipalities do not decline.

ii. Transparent Allocation of Funds for Education

Whilst the use of a standardised funding formula promotes greater equity across municipalities, it also aims to improve transparency and reduce opportunities for discretionary payments. Unfortunately however, key financial elements of the formula are not routinely made public, even to the municipalities, and so few people in Macedonia understand its impact on education financing (Herczyński 2011, 5; Levitas 2009, 24). USAID's 2011 assessment of education financing suggests certain procedural abnormalities further obscures how funds are allocated, fuelling misconceptions. The assessment found excessive use of both lower and upper buffers to regulate annual payments adjusts the amount of block grants in a way that is unclear to municipalities (Herczyński 2011, 5, 31). The fact that the allocation formula for the fiscal year is adopted in April, long before initial budget guidelines from the Ministry of Finance are issued which confirm how much funding is available and before final student numbers are known, also reduces transparency (2011, 12). The result is that MoES officials are no longer able to set important allocation coefficients in accordance to the actual relative needs of municipalities (2011)13.

9. Persistent Challenges to Decentralised Education

i. Ethnic Segregation in Schools

There is a growing trend of ethnic segregation in both primary and secondary schools, epitomising Marcel Baumann's concept of "voluntary apartheid" (Baumann 2009). In the longer term, it threatens to undermine the cohesion of Macedonian society and ultimately the state since, rather than represent a tool for promoting mutual understanding, the education system perpetuates mutual mistrust and intolerance between the different communities (Schenker 2011, 20; HCNM 2004, 2; MoES 2010b, 8). Improvements in the provision of mother tongue education, which necessitates students being taught in separate classes according to the language of instruction, may have been made at the expense of ethnic cohesion (UNICEF 2009, 23; UNDP 2004, 71). Multiple shifts, operating in most primary and secondary schools, are frequently being organised along linguistic (and therefore ethnic) lines rather than by grade. In more acute cases, students of different ethnicities are relocated in separate buildings and ultimately, if local politics and resources permit, schools may split into separate legal entities. According to a review prepared by the OSCE, more than half of all secondary students attending multilingual schools in 2008 were separated according to ethnicity in either separate buildings[21] or monolingual shifts[22] (OSCE, 2008d). The most high profile instances of ethnic separation in schools are found in Kumanovo and Struga municipalities, although additional examples exist in Kičevo, Šuto Orizari, Tetovo and Gostivar. The two new secondary

21 Four schools (all in Kumanovo municipality), which account for approximately 27 percent of all students attending multilingual schools.

22 Six schools in Gostivar, Debar, Struga, Tetovo and Skopje municipalities, which account for a further 24 percent of students attending multilingual schools.

schools opened for ethnic Albanian students in Kumanovo[23] and Lipkovo [24]during 2010 are examples of a simultaneous increase in the number of monolingual schools with Albanian-medium classes (UNICEF 2009, 55-58). Efforts by the International Community to prevent a two three schools from dividing in Kičevo and Kruševo during 2011 have been mixed (the school in Kičevo divided, while the school in Kruševo remains united for the time being). In most instances the segregation affects Macedonian and Albanian students, although the physical separation of Roma students is a growing concern (Sonce 2010, 6; Demarchi 2010, 37; OSI 2007, 243).

Increasing ethnic segregation in schools is not a direct consequence of the decentralisation process; its roots date back to the Yugoslav system of 'separate but equal' education for the different communities, whilst ethnic conflict in 2001 acted as a catalyst (Petroska-Beska & Najčevska 2004, 3). However, observers have suggested the enhanced 'voice' local politicians, teachers and parents now have in deciding important educational matters, such as the opening of new classes and schools, may have exacerbated the trend. Research suggests initial demands for segregating students often comes from parents, citing security concerns, via the School Board[25]. Local politicians have also been blamed for encouraging separation, since the opening of new classes, buildings and/or schools is considered an issue of political status, as well as an opportunity to create new jobs for one's community[26]. Splitting schools into separate entities represents a lack trust in the discretionary powers assigned to School Directors, since local communities believe that unless they have a school 'of their own' they will not receive a fair share of resources[27]. In the words of one international expert: "The political parties are not fighting for improving educational experience of students. If they were, they would never allow Albanian children to learn in *that* building in Kumanovo!"[28]. Whilst municipalities are not responsible for starting this trend, international observers have implied they are doing little to reverse it (CoE 2008, 63; ECRI 2005, 32). Given the extensive

23 'Sami Frashëri' school, previously part of the secondary school 'Goce Delčev'.

24 'Ismet Jashari', also previously a branch of 'Goce Delčev' school.

25 Representative of UNDP – interview, 25/06/2011, Skopje; representative of Forum Civil Peace Service - interview, 25/05/2011, Skopje.

26 Municipal Councillor, Struga municipality – interview, 02/06/2010; Education expert, OSCE – interview, 12/04/2011, Skopje.

27 International expert – interview, 04/04/2011, Skopje.

28 The expert was referring to the ZIK building in Kumanovo, where ethnic Albanian students from Goce Delčev secondary school were relocated to in 2001. (Interview, 04/04/2011, Skopje) The school became an independent entity in 2010 ('Sami Frashëri'), however reports suggest significant spatial challenges exist, with some classes being held in the corridors (ICG 2011, 18).

decision-making powers bestowed on them, municipalities could do more to promote the construction of larger multiethnic schools, located in areas accessible to all communities, rather than smaller mono-ethnic ones (UNDP 2009, 63; HCNM 2004, 2). Municipalities could also persuade School Boards to maintain shifts based on grades rather than language of instruction, and to implement joint school or inter-municipal projects aimed at fostering cooperation between students of different cultural backgrounds (UNICEF 2009, 10).

ii. Entrenchment of Patronage Politics

A second persistent, challenge to the delivery of quality, equitable education in Macedonia is the highly politicised environment within which decisions are made at school, municipal, and central levels. Whilst progress has been made in the de-politicisation of School Directors' appointments (through the involvement of School Boards and realisation of the School Director's exam), political influences remain and affect the appointment of school administrators, teachers; even cleaning ladies! (HCNM 2009, 4; Bakiu 2010, 28; Grozdanovska Dimishkovska 2009). Indeed, when asked by the OSCE whether the influence of politics in education has decreased or increased since the decentralisation process began, 18 percent of municipalities considered it had increased, 42 percent thought it had stayed the same, and 40 percent felt it had decreased [29] (OSCE 2009a, 65). In the same survey, a citizen's poll found responses to the same question to be 23.3 percent, 41.6 percent and 9.6 percent respectively (2009a, 66).

Substantial anecdotal evidence suggests relations between the municipalities and central authorities are also be affected by party politics. There is a widely-held perception centrally-appointed state inspectors target opposition-led municipalities, although has been less of a problem after the 2009 municipal elections since very few opposition-led municipalities exist. Opposition-led municipalities also experience prolonged delays in receiving responses from the MoES and there is a perception the annual budgets they submit to the Ministry of Finance are also "trimmed down"[30] (Bakiu 2010, 27). Finally, it is commonly assumed municipalities led by political parties in government receive preferential treatment in the allocation of capital expenditure for infrastructure projects (ICG 2011, 19). Indeed, of the 54 municipalities that changed political affilia-

29 Responses to the same question one year earlier were: 13 percent (increase), 40 percent (stayed the same), 47 percent (decreased) (OSCE 2008e, 17).

30 This has been confirmed by the SDSM opposition-led municipalities of Karpoš, Kumanovo, Strumica and Ohrid. OSCE official – interview, 24/06/2010, Skopje.

tion after the 2009 municipal elections, two-thirds of them received a larger allocation of capital funds once they became aligned with the parties in government (Appendix I). Whilst the decision to allocate funds to these municipalities may be based on entirely rational circumstances, in the absence of transparent criteria and the involvement of key stakeholders, such as representatives of the municipal association, decisions regarding the allocation of capital funds are likely to remain vulnerable to political influence[31] (ZELS, 2010).

iii. Capacity of Municipalities to Manage Education

Based on extensive research findings, Donald R. Winkler and Boon-Ling Yeo (2007) conclude simply changing the organisation of education has little, if any, impact on the delivery of education. It is how these new responsibilities are executed, they observed, that has an impact on service delivery. Effective delivery of education therefore depends upon the capacity of local stakeholders. It is worth considering that when an opinion poll commissioned by UNDP asked citizens who they believed could best provide educational services (central or local government), for three consecutive years the majority of respondents believed central government were best placed to do so[32] (UNDP 2010, 94; 2009, 78; 2008, 81). It is particularly surprising that the survey also reported a greater proportion of Albanians in favour of central rather than local government provision than any other ethnic group (2009, 79; 2008, 81). The survey findings indicate a low level of public confidence in the capacity of municipalities to provide educational services (2010, 103).

In an interview for a local think tank in 2010, former Minister of Education and Science, Sulejman Rushiti confirmed the "lack of administrative capacity" within some municipalities to effectively identify local education needs: "Most of the municipalities count only one or two employees in the sector for education, which...is far from sufficient" (Bakiu 2010, 28). As with own-source contributions to local education budgets, significant disparities exist regarding the administrative capacities of larger urban and less affluent rural municipalities. This is not a surprise when municipalities such as Rosoman, with a total staff of six people, and Arachinovo with seven, are tasked with delivering the

31 Representative of the World Bank – interview, 08/04/2011, Skopje; Executive Director, ZELS – interview Service, 08/04/2011, Skopje.

32 In fact, the proportion of citizens preferring central government control over education increased annually, from 52.2 percent in 2008, to 55 percent in 2009 and 69 percent in 2010. In contrast, support for municipal control fell from 41.1 percent, to 30 percent and 28 percent in the respective years.

same responsibilities as Strumica and Tetovo municipalities with 134 and 158 members of staff respectively (MCIC 2010). More than three years after the decentralisation of education responsibilities, less than half (40) of all municipalities employed a dedicated officer for education matters in 2009. The remaining municipalities either designated officers already employed in another area of work or had no-one at all[33]. A similar practice exists with the appointment of Municipal Education Inspectors, where approximately only 15 municipalities have appointed one[34].

Even Kumanovo, which employs 118 people and has a combined primary/secondary student population of 19,154, has only two officers working on education issues and does not employ a Municipal Education Inspector[35] (SSO 2011). Given the inability of many municipalities to assign sufficient resources to the management of educational matters, and in the absence of much needed inter-municipal co-operation, it is little wonder citizens are failing to notice improvements.

33 OSCE official – interview, 04/04/2011, Skopje.

34 Senior representative of the MoES – interview, 07/04/2011, Skopje; OSCE official – interview, 04/04/2011, Skopje.

35 Municipal Education Officer – interview, 05/04/2011, Kumanovo.

10. Summary

This paper has examined whether decentralisation has satisfied the demands of non-majority groups for greater control over how primary and secondary education is delivered. Following an evaluation of the system prior to decentralisation, a comprehensive analysis of the administrative and fiscal reforms introduced in 2005 was conducted. The review argues that the decentralisation process has facilitated heterogeneous policy-making in the delivery (but not design) of educational services, although further progress has been hampered by a lack of finances and central government support. The provision of Albanian and Turkish-medium education, for example, has generally improved; although some would argue this has come at the expense of quality. However, the experiences of the smaller communities in accessing education in their mother tongue – either as the language of instruction or in elective classes – are less positive. Greater community involvement in decision-making processes has also improved transparency and allowed what were once highly contentious issues, such as the renaming of schools or the opening of a new school, to be made rationally. Finally, the move to a per capita funding allocation formula in 2006 has facilitated a more equitable distribution of state resources. Nevertheless, challenges remain and further work needs to be done, to fine-tune funding formulas and ensure School Boards are genuinely representative of students, if the progress made in the first five years of decentralisation is to continue.

Decentralisation is no panacea, however. Problems which existed in the education system prior to decentralisation remain and may indeed have been exacerbated by the reforms. Ethnic segregation in schools is increasing at a disturbing rate and, despite having the legal competencies to do so, municipalities have done little to reverse this trend. The entrenchment of patronage politics, a persistent feature of the education system, is also unrelenting, and may now be more visible to citizens, given their proximity to where decisions are being made. The decentralisation process is still in its infancy and it is reasonable that the capacities of municipalities to carry out new functions will require further strengthening. Nevertheless, these persistent challenges, unless adequately addressed by both the municipalities and central government, threaten to undermine the benefits of decentralised education in the longer term.

Appendices

Appendix A: Proportion of Ethnic-Turkish Pupils Learning in their Mother tongue (Regular Primary and Lower Secondary Schools)

Year	No. of Pupils	No. of Pupils Learning in Mother Tongue	Pupils Learning in Mother Tongue
2004/05	9,514	5,561	58.45
2005/06	-	-	-
2006/07	9,599	5,998	62.49
2007/08	9,451	5,977	63.24
2008/09	9,304	5,715	61.43
2009/10	9,161	6,038	65.90

Source: State Statistical Office (2006; 2008; 2009; 2010a; 2011)

Appendix B: Approximate[36] Proportion of Ethnic-Turkish Students Learning in their Mother Tongue (Higher Secondary Schools)

Year	No. of Ethnic-Turkish Students	No. of Students Learning in Turkish	Approx. No. of Ethnic Turkish Students Learning in Mother Tongue (%)
2004/05	2,378	1,090	45.84
2005/06	-	-	-
2006/07	2,632	1,216	46.20
2007/08	2,695	1,326	49.20
2008/09	2,845	1,465	51.50
2009/10	2,948	1,476	50.07

Source: State Statistical Office (2006; 2008; 2009; 2010a; 2011)

36 I have calculated the proportion of ethnic-Turkish students studying in their mother tongue by dividing the total number of students learning through the medium of Turkish with the total number of ethnic-Turkish students. There is a possibility students from other ethnic backgrounds may have chosen to study in Turkish and this has consequently inflated the overall proportion.

Appendix C: Number of Schools (including Branches) and Class Sections, According to Language of Instruction (Regular Primary and Lower Secondary Schools)

Year	2003/04		2004/05		2005/06		2006/07	
	No. of Schools	Class Sections	No. of Schools	Class Sections	No. of Schools	Class Sections	No. of Schools	Class Sections
Macedonian	764	6,578	759	6,506	748	6,986	740	6,968
Albanian	280	3,087	284	3,105	286	3,449	288	3,453
Turkish	57	272	57	274	60	353	61	318
Serbian	11	37	10	35	8	35	8	36
Total	1,012	9,974	1,010	9,920	1,005	10,823	1,000	10,775

Total	2007/08		2008/2009		2009/10	
	No. of Schools	Class Sections	No. of Schools	Class Sections	No. of Schools	Class Sections
Macedonian	737	6,927	734	6,924	729	6,812
Albanian	289	3,431	287	3,440	289	3,426
Turkish	60	321	60	318	62	348
Serbian	8	34	7	31	7	36
Total	997	10,713	991	10,713	990	10,622

Source: State Statistical Office (2006; 2008; 2009; 2010a; 2011)

Appendix D: Number of Schools (including Branches) and Class Sections, According to Language of Instruction (Regular Upper Secondary Schools)

Year	2003/04		2004/05		2005/06		2006/07	
	No. of Schools	Class Sections	No. of Schools	Class Sections	No. of Schools	Class Sections	No. of Schools	Class Sections
Macedonian	89	2,441	90	2,445	-	-	93	2,418
Albanian	23	521	27	609	-	-	29	696
Turkish	5	25	8	26	-	-	8	41
English	6	45	6	54	-	-	7	64
Total[37]	96	3,032	100	3,134	-	-	104	3,219

Year	2007/08		2008/2009		2009/10	
	No. of Schools	Class Sections	No. of Schools	Class Sections	No. of Schools	Class Sections
Macedonian	96	2,401	99	2,394	99	2,422
Albanian	32	722	33	781	35	853
Turkish	9	48	10	55	10	59
English	7	66	7	65	5	64
Total	107	3,237	110	3,295	110	3,398

Source: State Statistical Office (2006; 2008; 2009; 2010a; 2011)

Appendix E: Proportion of Ethnic- Serbian Pupils Learning in their Mother Tongue (Regular Primary and Lower Secondary Schools)

Year	No. of Pupils	No. of Pupils Learning in Mother Tongue	Pupils Learning in Mother Tongue
2004/05	2,335	174	7.45
2005/06	-	-	-
2006/07	2,242	193	8.61
2007/08	2,076	177	8.53
2008/09	1,943	177	9.11
2009/10	1,871	153	8.18

Source: State Statistical Office (2006; 2008; 2009; 2010a; 2011)

37 The cumulative totals of both primary and secondary schools do not match the values included in the 'total' column since some schools are bi or trilingual.

Appendix F: Total Number of Pupils Learning in the Macedonian Language, according to Ethnicity (Regular Primary and Lower Secondary Schools)

Year	2004/05		2005/06	2006/07		2007/08	
Macedonian	122,378	85.2	-	121,982	84.4	118,467	84.4
Albanian	1,523	1.1	-	1,644	1.1	1,548	1.1
Turkish	3,891	2.7	-	3,581	2.5	3,444	2.5
Roma	8,073	5.6	-	9,321	6.4	9,484	6.7
Vlach	434	0.3	-	406	0.3	366	0.3
Serbian	2,161	1.5	-	2,049	1.4	1,899	1.4
Other	4,985	3.5	-	5,426	3.8	4,950	3.5
Not specified	6	0.0	-	153	0.1	155	0.1
Unknown	165	0.1	-	26	0.0	1	0.0
Total	143,616	100.0	-	144,588	100.0	140,314	100.0

Year	2008/2009		2009/10	
Macedonian	115,554	84.0	112,272	84.1
Albanian	1,454	1.1	1,230	0.9
Turkish	3,570	2.6	3,115	2.3
Roma	9,894	7.2	9,710	7.3
Vlach	353	0.3	400	0.3
Serbian	1,766	1.3	1,718	1.3
Other	4,743	3.4	4,991	3.8
Not specified	113	0.1	15	0.0
Unknown	20	0.0	17	0.0
Total	137,467	100.0	133,468	100.0

Appendix G: Regular and Lower Secondary Schools According to the Number of Pupils

	No. of Schools						
No. of Pupils	2003/04	2004/05	2005/06	2006/07	2007/08	2008/09	2009/10
Up to 20	300	310	-	278	292	302	301
21 – 50	171	167	-	177	173	166	178
Total no. of schools	1,012	1,010	-	1,000	997	991	990

Source: State Statistical Office (2006; 2008; 2009; 2010a; 2011) Appendix H: Representativeness of 60 Primary School Board Members,

Appendix H: Representativeness of 60 Primary School Board Members, According to the Ethnic Profile of Pupils[38] (USAID 2011)

No.	Ethnic Profile	Mac	Alb	Turk	Roma	Vlach	Serb	Bos	Oth-er	Total	Rep?
1	School population	295	15	10	518	-	-	-	-	843	
	Board members	7	-	-	2	-	-	-	-	9	No
2	School population	297	332	9	5	5	5	5	42	695	
	Board members	6	3	-	-	-	-	-	-	9	No
3	School population	37	717	6	8	-	1	87	6	862	
	Board members	3	5	-	-	-	-	-	-	8	No
4	School population	3	340	80	91	-	-	6	5	525	
	Board members	1	4	2	1	-	-	1		9	Yes
5	School population	146	136	7	585	-	5	60	12	951	
	Board members	6	2	-	1	-	-	-	-	9	No
6	School population	182	-	-	3	-	32	-	-	217	
	Board members	6	3	-	-	-	-	-	-	9	Yes
7	School population	40	599	89	172	-	-	-	236	1136	
	Board members	1	8	-	-	-	-	-	-	9	No
8	School population	-	517	-	84	-	-	-	-	601	
	Board members	-	8	-	1	-	-	-	-	9	Yes
9	School population	567	-	4	79	-	-	-	-	650	
	Board members	9	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	9	No

38 I have underlined the instances where I consider a particular ethnic community is under-represented on the School Board.

10	School population	193	7	41	14	-	22	-	-	284	
	Board members	9	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	9	No
11	School population	746	47	4	144	3	17	19	4	984	
	Board members	9	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	9	No
12	School population	352	134	-	7	-	2	-	-	495	
	Board members	7	2	-	-	-	-	-	-	9	Yes
13	School population	723	7	12	2	-	24	49	2	819	
	Board members	9	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	9	Yes
14	School population	228	114	-	3	-	6	-	2	353	
	Board members	9	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	9	No
15	School population	369	164	-	95	-	-	5	2	635	
	Board members	7	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	8	No
16	School population	172	10	22	47	-	1	57	2	311	
	Board members	8	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	9	No
17	School population	465	-	-	208	-	4	-	-	677	
	Board members	9	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	9	No
18	School population	484	673	52	330	-	1	-	2	1542	
	Board members	3	5	-	1	-	-	-	-	9	Yes
19	School population	597	412	-	55	-	-	-	-	1092	
	Board members	5	4	-	-	-	-	-	-	9	Yes
20	School population	-	1287	143	-	-	-	-	-	1430	
	Board members	-	9	-	-	-	-	-	-	9	No

No.	Ethnic Profile	Mac	Alb	Turk	Roma	Vlach	Serb	Bos	Other	Total	Rep?
21	School population	28	39	-	-	-	-	-	-	419	
	Board members	8	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	9	No
22	School population	239	14	8	41	-	-	43	-	345	
	Board members	8	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	9	No
23	School population	336	-	-	64	-	24	-	-	424	
	Board members	5	-	-	-	-	2	-	2	9	No
24	School population	988	74	-	6	-	12	-	-	1080	
	Board members	9	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	9	No
25	School population	280	9	-	5	-	31	-	-	350	
	Board members	9	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	9	No
26	School population	123	197	-	-	-	-	-	-	323	
	Board members	6	3	-	-	-	-	-	-	9	No
27	School population	220	-	61	-	3	-	-	-	384	
	Board members	7	-	1	-	1	-	-	-	9	Yes
28	School population	340	-	-	1	-	5	-	7	353	
	Board members	7	-	-	-	-	2	-	-	9	Yes
29	School population	180	704	237	380	-	-	-	-	1501	
	Board members	1	6	-	2	-	-	-	-	9	No
30	School population	518	-	34	1	-	-	-	-	553	
	Board members	8	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	9	Yes

31	School population	458	-	-	5	5	2	-	-	470	
	Board members	8	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	9	Yes
32	School population	412	-	-	1	1	-	-	5	419	
	Board members	8	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	8	Yes
33	School population	628	-	6	83	2	-	-	-	719	
	Board members	9	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	9	No
34	School population	636	-	6	57	3	-	-	1	703	
	Board members	9	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	9	Yes
35	School population	217	-	70	-	-	-	-	-	287	
	Board members	9	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	9	No
36	School population	686	-	-	66	-	-	-	-	752	
	Board members	9	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	9	No
37	School population	656	-	-	3	-	94	-	-	753	
	Board members	6	-	-	-	-	3	-	-	9	Yes
38	School population	439	89	-	35	-	59	-	-	622	
	Board members	7	1	-	-	-	1	-	-	9	No
39	School population	29	22	-	9	-	-	-	2	62	
	Board members	5	4	-	-	-	-	-	-	9	Yes
40	School population	175	-	35	-	-	-	-	-	211	
	Board members	9	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	9	No

No.	Ethnic Profile	Mac	Alb	Turk	Roma	Vlach	Serb	Bos	Other	Total	Rep?
41	School population	654	8	16	122	-	13	-	13	826	
	Board members	9	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	9	No
42	School population	403	300	200	17	-	-	-	238	1158	
	Board members	2	3	3	-	-	-	-	-	9	No
43	School population	30	113	4	-	-	-	160	-	307	
	Board members	1	6	-	-	-	-	2	-	9	No
44	School population	432	215	-	16	-	43	50	1	757	
	Board members	9	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	9	No
45	School population	65	17	-	-	-	-	-	-	82	
	Board members	8	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	9	Yes
46	School population	51	79	-	-	-	-	-	-	130	
	Board members	4	5	-	-	-	-	-	-	9	Yes
47	School population	93	-	-	-	-	9	-	-	102	
	Board members	7	-	-	-	-	2	-	-	9	Yes
48	School population	455	3	25	229	13	1	-	-	726	
	Board members	8	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	9	No
49	School population	699	-	4	36	38	-	-	5	752	
	Board members	7	-	-	-	2	-	-	-	9	Yes
50	School population	439	710	56	73	3	2	-	24	1307	
	Board members	4	4	1	-	-	-	-	-	9	Yes

51	School population	237	22	-	-	-	-	-	-	259	
	Board members	7	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	8	Yes
52	School population	15	268	-	-	-	-	-	-	283	
	Board members	1	8	-	-	-	-	-	-	9	Yes
53	School population	140	239	25	15	-	-	-	-	419	
	Board members	3	3	3	-	-	-	-	-	9	Yes
54	School population	244	38	-	44	-	5	-	7	338	
	Board members	7	2	-	-	-	-	-	-	9	No
55	School population	619	938	26	30	-	-	-	-	1613	
	Board members	3	5	1	-	-	-	-	-	9	Yes
56	School population	350	175	1	110	-	-	2	-	638	
	Board members	7	2	-	-	-	-	-	-	9	No
57	School population	394	-	29	2	-	9	-	3	437	
	Board members	7	-	1	-	-	1	-	-	9	Yes
58	School population	191	-	37	-	-	48	-	-	276	
	Board members	8	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	9	Yes
59	School population	271	13	37	158	-	4	2	-	485	
	Board members	8	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	9	No
60	School population	475	-	28	168	-	-	-	1	672	
	Board members	9	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	9	No

Appendix I: Capital Expenditures for Education, According to Municipality (2006-09)

No.	Municipality	2006	2007	2008	2009	Funding Trend?
1	Arachinovo	0.00[40]	0.00	0.00	18.82	Yes
2	Berovo	5.05	26.51	15.13	64.97	Yes
3	Bogdanci	0.00	2.34	103.24	282.60	Yes
4	Bogovinje	0.00	28.82	60.23	77.50	Yes
5	Bosilovo	0.00	0.00	11.09	27.82	Yes
6	Brvenica	0.00	263.87	46.72	44.66	No
7	Vasilevo	0.00	10.13	65.93	22.28	No
8	Vevčani	0.00[41]	0.00	0.00	0.00	No
9	Veles	16.87	77.38	90.20	158.55	Yes
10	Vinica	11.01	11.50	5.28	19.06	Yes
11	Vrapchishte	0.00	0.00	0.00	12.17	Yes
12	Gevgelija	2.50	15.77	78.05	259.84	Yes
13	Gostivar	62.51	88.53	29.86	1.29	No
14	Debar	0.00	10.93	0.00	186.54	Yes
15	Delchevo	14.19	17.89	10.41	33.44	Yes
16	Demir Kapija	0.00	0.00	0.00	67.64	Yes
17	Demir Hisar	0.00	2.09	0.00	26.73	Yes
18	Dojran	0.00	16.68	15.03	300.17	Yes
19	Dolneni	0.00	26.31	32.80	14.56	No
20	Drugovo	0.00	47.23	45.45	36.64	No
21	Zajas	0.00	8.34	149.31	0.00	No
22	Kavadarci	25.40	22.77	129.83	141.54	Yes
23	Karbinci	0.00	18.10	2.70	467.82	Yes
24	Kičevo	9.93	0.30	0.00	115.07	Yes
25	Konče	0.00	0.00	180.86	329.36	Yes
26	Kocani	18.14	17.87	65.11	167.53	Yes
27	Kriva Palanka	4.70	5.95	25.45	171.48	Yes
28	Krivogastani	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	No
29	Kruševo	7.29	10.31	21.92	63.45	Yes

39 The shaded values represent a year where the municipality was run by a political party in opposition centrally.

40 A shaded figure represents a year where the municipality was run by an independent candidate.

No.	Municipality	2006	2007	2008	2009	Funding Trend?
30	Lipkovo	0.00	0.00	0.00	43.99	Yes
31	Lozovo	0.00	0.00	13.26	9.24	No
32	Mavrovo & Rostuse	0.00	14.19	56.86	103.18	Yes
33	Makedonski Brod	0.00	10.77	147.79	109.38	No
34	Makedonska Kamenica	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	No
35	Negotino	3.35	15.51	47.04	52.68	No
36	Oslomej	0.00	0.00	0.00	221.55	Yes
37	Petrovec	14.47	11.07	159.04	191.86	Yes
38	Probishtip	0.00	0.00	4.82	5.82	No
39	Resen	0.00	0.00	27.78	25.43	No
40	Rosoman	0.00	0.00	77.61	427.82	Yes
41	Staro Nagoričane	0.00	0.00	0.00	81.53	Yes
42	Sopište	0.00	283.82	195.86	1062.51	Yes
43	Struga	25.30	32.24	27.61	54.80	Yes
44	Studeničani	0.00	45.78	75.03	8.98	No
45	Tearce	1.93	2.10	21.89	65.42	Yes
6	Tetovo	31.78	140.11	233.15	199.10	Yes
47	Centar Zupa	4.75	112.99	197.81	138.55	Yes
48	Čaška	0.00	0.00	10.44	20.68	Yes
49	Češinovo-Obleševo	0.00	0.00	10.79	20.26	Yes
50	Stip	13.57	15.77	16.06	44.26	Yes
51	Gjorge Petrov	0.00	22.87	43.45	14.41	No
52	Saraj	0.00	0.00	0.00	2.73	No
53	Čair	0.35	0.60	0.58	118.88	Yes
54	City of Skopje	25.32	33.88	48.97	33.45	No

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

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